0 there's no doubt in my mind that our efforts prevented an attack on the homeland from afghanistan which was our core original mission. and everyone who served in that war should be proud. your service mattered. beginning in 2011, we steadily drew down our troop numbers, consolidated and closed bases and retrograded equipment from afghanistan. at the peak in 2011, we had 97,000 u.s. troops alongside 41,000 nato troops in afghanistan. ten years later, when the ambassador signed the doha agreement lton 29 february 2020 the united states had 12,600 troops with 8,000 nato and 10,500 contractors. this has been a ten-year multi-administration drawdown, not a 19-month or 19-day one. under the doha agreement, the u.s. would begin to withdraw forces contingent upon taliban meeting certain conditions, which would lead to a political agreement between the taliban and the government of afghanistan. there were seven conditions applicable to the taliban and eight conditions applicable to the united states. while the taliban did not attack u.s. forces, which was one of the conditions, it failed to fully honor any other condition under the doha agreement. perhaps most importantly for u.s. national security, the taliban has snnever reannounced al qaeda or broke its affiliation with them. we the united states adhered to every condition. in the fall of 2020, my analysis was that an accelerated withdrawal without meeting specific and necessary conditions, risks losing the substantial gains made in afghanistan, damaging u.s. worldwide credibility, and could precip tatd a general collapse of the afghan government resulting in a complete taliban takeover or general civil war. that was a year ago. my assessment remained consistent throughout. based on my advice, the advice of the commanders, then secretary of defense esper submitted a memorandum on 9 november recommending to maintain u.s. forces at a level between about 2,500 and 4,500 in afghanistan until conditions were met for further reduction. two days later, on 11 november 2020, i received an unclassified, signed order directing united states military to withdraw all forces from afghanistan no later than 15 january 2021. after further discussions regarding the risks associated with such a withdrawal, the order was rescinded. on 17 november, we received a new order to reduce levels of 2,500 plus enabling forces no later than 15 january. when president biden was inaugurated, there were approximately 3,500 u.s. troops, 5,400 nato troops and 6,300 contractors in afghanistan with the specified task of train, allege advise and assist, along with a small contingent of counterterrorism forces. the biden administration through the national security council process conducted a rigorous review of the situation in afghanistan in february, march, and april. during this process, the views of the joint cheechs of staff, all of us, the centcom commander, general mckenzie, the u.s. commander, general miller, and myself all given serious consideration of the administration, we provided a broad range of options. l and our assessment of their potential outcome. the cost, benefit, risk to force, risk to mission were evaluated. on 14 april, the president announced his decision and the u.s. military received a change of mission to retrograde all u.s. military forces, maintain a small contingency force of 600 to 700 to protect the embassy in kabul until the department of state could coordinate security support and assist turkey to maintain the karzai international airport and transition the u.s. military to an over the horizon security force assistance. it is clear, it is obvious the war in afghanistan did not end on the terms we wanted with the taliban now in power in kabul. although the neo was unprecedented as the largest air evacuation in history, evacuating 124,000 people, it came at an incredible cost of 11 marines, one soldier, and a navy corpsman. those 13 gave their lives of people they never met to have an opportunity to live in freedom. and we must remember that the taliban was and remains a terrorist organization, and they still have not broken ties with al qaeda. i have no illusionings who we are dealing with. it remains to be seen whether or not the taliban can consolidate power or if the country will further fracture into civil war. we must continue to protect the united states of america and it people from terrorist attacks coming from afghanistan. a reconstituted al qaeda or isis with aspirations to attack the united states is a very real possibility. and those conditions to include activity and ungoverned spaces could present themselves in the next 12 to 36 months. that mission will be much harder now but not impossible, and we will continue to protect the american people. strategic decisions have strategic consequences. over the course of four presidents, 12 secretaries of defense, 7 chairman, 10 centcom commanders, 20 commanders in afghanistan, hundreds of congressional delegation visits, and 20 years of congressional oversight, there are many lessons to be learned, two specific to the military we need to take a look at and we will, is did we mirror image the development of the afghan national army and the second is the unprecedented rapid collapse of the. afghan military in only 11 days in august. however, one lesson must never be forgotten. every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine who served there in afghanistan for 20 consecutive years protected our country from attack by terrorists, and for that they should be forever proud and we should be forever grateful. thank you, chairman, and if i could, i know that there's some issues in the media that are of deep concern to many members on the committee, and with your permission i old like to address those for a minute or two. i've submitted memoranda. >> you may proceed. >> i've served this nation for 42 years. i spent years in combat, and i buried a lot of my troops who died while defending this country. my loyalty to this nation, its people, and the constitution hasn't changed and will never change as long as i have a breath to give. my loyalty is absolute and i will not turn my back on the following. with respect to the chinese calls, i routinely communicated with my counterpart general lee with the knowledge and coordination of civilian oversight. i am specifically directed to communicate with the chinese by department of defense guidance, the policy dialogue system. these military-to-military communications at the highest level are critical l to the security of the united states in order to deconflict military actions, manage crises, and prevent war between great powers that are armed with the world's most deadliest weapons. the calls on 30 october and 8 january were coordinated before and after with secretary esper and acting secretary miller's stamps and the interagency. the specific -- which caused us to believe the chinese were worried about an attack on them by the united states. i know, i am certain that president trump did not intend to attack the chinese, and it is my directed responsibility and it was my directed responsibility by the secretary to convey that intent to the chinese. my task at that time was to de-escalate. my message again was consistent -- stay calm, steady, and de-escalate. we are not going to attack you. at secretary of defense esper's direction, i made a call to general lee on 30 october. eight people sat on that call with me and i read out the call within 30 minutes of the call ending. on 31 december, the chinese requested another call with me. the deputy assistant secretary of defense for asia-pacific policy hemmed coordinate my call, which was then scheduled for 8 january, and he made a preliminary call on 6 january. 11 people attended that call with me and readouts of this call were distributed to the interagency that same day. shortly after my call ended with general lee, i personally informed both secretary of state pompeo and white house chief of staff meld dmeld does about the call. soon after that, i attended a meeting with secretary miller and briefed him on the call. late they're same day on 8 january, speaker of the house pelosi called me to inquire about the president's ability to launch nuclear weapons. i sought to assure her that nuclear launch is governed by a very specific and deliberate process. she was concerned and made various personal references characterizing the president. i explained to her that the president is the sole nuclear launch authority and he doesn't launch them alone and that i am not qualified to determine the mental health of the president of the united states. there are processes, protocols, and procedures in place, and i repeatedly assured her that there was no chance of an illegal, unauthorized, or accidental launch. by presidential directive and secretary of defense directive, the chairman is part of the process to ensure the president is fully informed on determining the use of the world's deadliest weapons. by law i am not in the chain of command and i know that. however, by presidential directive and dod instruction, i am in the chain of communication to fulfilly legal statutory role as the president's primary military adviser. after the speaker pelosi call i convened a short meeting in my office with key members of my staff to refresh all of us on the procedures which we daily at that level. i informed miller of speaker pelosi's phone call. at no time was i attempting to change or influence the process, usurp authority, or insert myself in the chain of command. but i am expected, i am required to give my advice and ensure that the president is fully informed on military matters. i am submitting for the record a more detailed and unclassified memorandum i believe you have, although late. i'd be happy to talk about the intelligence that droech these calls. i'm happy to make available an email, phone logs, memoranda, witnesses or anything else you need to understand these events. my oath is to support the constitution of the united states of america against all enemies foreign and domestic. and i will never turn my back on that oath. i firmly believe in civilian control of the military as a bedrock principle essential to the health of this republic and i'm committed to ensuring the military stays clear of domestic politics. i look forward to your questions. thank you, chairman, for the extra time. >> thank you, general. general mckenzie, i understand you do not have a statement. is that correct? >> i waive my statement. >> thank you very much, general. secretary, the doha agreement represents direct negotiations with terrorists and not just negotiations but an agreement with them that excluded the afghan government and the allies who have been been fighting with us now since 9/11. it set a fixed departure date with conditions has indicated were not really followed consistently by the taliban. as you considered in april what to do, did the intelligence suggest to you that reneging on the departure of the troops would lead to significant attacks against american and allied military forces? >> chairman, my recollection, the intelligence was clear that if we did not leave in accordance with that agreement, the taliban would recommence attacks on our forces. >> and they would include any means they could use to attack american forces. >> that's correct, chairman. >> so the choice was in many respects, were we going to incur additional casualties indefinitely in afghanistan. that's one way to look at it. is that fair? >> that's correct, chairman. you certainly would have to do -- take additional measures to be able to defend yourself if the taliban recommenced their offensive operations against us. general milley and general mckenzie, did the doha agreement affect the morralale of the afg forces? was there a sense now that even though it was months away that the united states was leaving since we had agree to leave? >> i'll let frank talk to the details but my assessment is yes, senator, it did affect the morale of the forces. >> general? >> i believe it did negatively affect the forces particularly by some of the actions the government of afghanistan was required to take under an agreement. >> one of the critical issues was the agreement to withdraw contrac contractors, basically the engine that maintains the air force of afghanistan and many other logistical operations and that was just as critical as the troop departure, i would assume. >> chairman, it feels. we had plans in place to try to conduct those operations from over the horizon. they were not as effective as having contractors on the ground onsite with the aircraft. >> the momentum appeared to be shifting to the taliban. indications were their penetration in parts of the country in the northern sections particularly, which traditionally oppose the taliban, the northern alliance, but that started -- to be fair, that started long before doha. there are some commentators who suggest that since 2014 the taliban have been surrounding provincial capitals, insinuating themselves into the politics of the local communities, striking bargains. is that your impression, too, general mckenzie? >> sir, i think it is a good assessment from 2014 on the taliban pursued that strategy and had some success. the government of afghanistan had success holding on to centralized urban areas and population centers. but the taliban pursued a distinct strategy and had some success with it. >> secretary halston, you did provide the best military advice to the president regarding the situation in afghanistan and as has been recounted several times there were multiple meetings and he received the advice of many different orders. do you feel you had the opportunity to make your alleged vice very clear? >> i do, chairman. as i've said before, i always keep my advice to the president confidential, but i am very much satisfied that we had a thorough policy review and i believe that all of the parties had an opportunity to provide input and that input was received. >> thank you very much. senator. >> thank you, mr. chairman. it was two weeks ago that we had a closed, classified hearing. we had general miller's recommendation at that time. let me first of all just mention that during the confirmation process you committed -- speaking now to general mckenzie and general milley -- to giving your honest and personal views to this committee, even if those viewings were different from those of the administration, and i'm confident you will be doing that. during this hearing that we had, it was emphasized to us from general miller that we -- he was recommending that 2,500 troops in afghanistan. now, we didn't receive the documentation from your offices, i approach tosay to the witness until 10:35 last night, so there really wasn't time to get into a lot of the detail ls. but i'd ask general mckenzie, did you agree to the recommendation that general miller had two weeks ago? >> senator, again, i won't share my personal recommendation to the president, but i will give you my honest opinion, and i recommended we retain 2,500 troops in afghanistan and also recommended earlier in the fall of 2020 we maintain 4,500 at that time. those with my personal views. i also have a view that the withdrawal of those forces would lead inevitably to the collapse of the afghan military forces and eventually the afghan government. i understand that. general milley, i assume you agree with that in terms of the recommendation of 2,500. >> what i said in my opening statement and the memoranda that i wrote back in the fall of tw2020 remained consistent and i do agree with that. >> this committee is unsure whether general milley's recommendation ever got to the president. you know, obviously there are conversations with the president, but i would like to ask general mckenzie, i think you've all made this statement, did you talk to the president about general miller's recommendation? >> sir, i was present when that discussion was heard, and i'm confident that the president heard all the recommendations and listened to them very thoughtfully. >> one of the recommendations made by the three of you would be the recommendation that virtually was made by general miller's -- to weeks ago. during the august 18th interview on abc, george stephanopoulos asked president biden whether u.s. troops would stay beyond august 31st if there are still americans to evacuate. president biden responded, and this is a quote, if there's american citizens left, we're going to stay to get them all out. this didn't happen. the -- president biden's decision resulted in all the troops leaving, but american citizens are still trying to get out. how many american citizens is it your opinion are still there? just go down the line, each one of you. anyone? >> senator, i would defer to the state department for that assess m ment. that's a dynamic process. they've been contacting the civilians that are in afghanistan. and, again, i would defer to them for definitive numbers. >> mm-hmm. go ahead. others? >> same as the secretary just said. there were numbers at the beginning of the process with the f-77 report out of the embassy, and we know that we took out almost 6,000, i guess it is, american citizens, but how many remain -- >> do all of you agree that secretary of state blinken, when he made his analysis as to how many people would be here but would still be there, talked about 10,000 to 15,000 citizens left behind, and the -- and then evacuated some 6,000, that would mean a minimum of 4,000 would be -- would still be there? anyone disagree with that? by your silence i assume you agree. >> i have no -- i don't -- i personally don't believe there are 4,000 american citizens still left in afghanistan, but i cannot confirm or deny that, senator. >> i see. the secretary of state was probably wrong in his analysis. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. just for the record, the chair and the vice chair/ranking member have each abided by the five-minute rule. fair to iis fair. >> thank you, mr. chairman and secretary austin, general milley and general mckenzie being here this morning and senator austin and general milley, thanking you for your effort to put into some historical perspective what happened in afghanistan and for recognizing the incredible surveillance and sacrifice of the troops who served there. general milley, in a hearing before the senate appropriations subcommittee on defense in june, i explicitly raised concerns about the risk to afghans due to our withdrawal and i asked about the department's plans to evacuate them. now, you indicated today that you thought we might be facing a kind of desperate situation that we saw in kabul, but your response at that time was that, quote, lots of planning was ongoing and this is -- end quote -- and the state department was leading efforts pertaining to evacuating our afghan partners. you explicitly told the committee that in your professional opinion you did not see saigon 1975 in afghanistan. so i'm just trying to figure out why we missed from a public perception it appears that we didn't anticipate the rapid fall of afghanistan and kabul and the rise of the taliban in the way we saw it play out on television. and what did we miss? >> i think, senator, we absolutely missed the rapid 11-day collapse of the afghan military and the collapse of their government. i think there was a lot of intelligence that clearly indicated that after we withdrew that it was a likely outcome of a collapse of the military, a collapse of the government. moeps of those intelligence assessments indicated that would occur late fall, perhaps early winter, kabul might hold till next spring. it depends on when the intel assessment was written. so after we leave, the assessments were pret city v ti cons -- pretty consistent you'd see a general collapse of the government and the m