withjohn simpson. hello, and thank you for joining me for another edition of unspun world, where we find out from the bbc�*s unmatched team of correspondents and broadcasters what's really going on in the world. israeli forces are encircling gaza's hospitals, but what's their basic strategy? the israeli army can probably go in and patrol the shattered streets of the gaza strip for some indefinite period. but what then? who is actually going to rule gaza? the us and china. why are the chinese noticeably less antagonistic than they used to be? the united states is china's biggest threat, but it's also china's biggest customer, and they really need to do some good customer relations at the moment. and can spain's interim prime minister stave off catalan independence? he's doing this because it will reduce those tensions that catalonia has been seeing, really over the last decade. western support for israel's war against hamas in gaza has been tested as never before, by the bombardment and search of the al—shifa hospital by israeli troops. it's a huge complex, and israel has long claimed that hamas has established a "major command base" there, underneath the hospital building or its grounds. the un and other international agencies have said that even if there is a hamas base under the hospital, it's israel's duty to avoid any action which might threaten the lives of the patients or the medical staff. but where are we now in the crisis? paul adams is the bbc�*s diplomatic correspondent, and he's been reporting from jerusalem. we are starting to see signs of extreme disquiet around the world. from the eu obviously, but also from the united states, with officials there saying, "look, we can't have gun battles "going on outside hospitals." so i think we will — we are getting to the point where israel's closest friends are going to begin to say, "look, have you achieved enough here?" and of course, we're only still, in theory, at least, in the first half off the ground campaign, the bit that focuses on gaza city. it's obviously the big target, as far as israel is concerned. they believe that that's where hamas has much of its command and control network, a lot of that underground. but what happens when they've finished with gaza city? what happens if the idf decides to go south, to the southern two—thirds of the gaza strip, where almost the entire population of gaza has now been crammed in there? at that point, israel might find itself operating without the kind of international cover that it has had so far. let's just briefly talk about the al—shifa hospital. it is credible, is it, that hamas has its "command and control bases" and everything underneath the hospital? it is clearly an object of extreme significance to both sides, because why would we be having this appalling standoff otherwise? the israelis have said for years that hamas have "significant structures" underneath shifa. and of course, those have been denied by hamas officials, and indeed by doctors inside shifa hospital itself. but it does look, doesn't it, as though hamas foresaw all of these different things, and planned it in order for israel to get the kind of diplomatic criticism — actually not just diplomatic criticism that it's been receiving, that this is all part of the hamas playbook. they must have known that attacking israel in that way would invite a response, the like of which they have never seen before. did they anticipate that it would come down to a kind of last stand at shifa hospital? who knows? maybe. and one does get the sense, that with each passing day, there must be a hope in hamas circles that the news of premature babies dying, one by one, with each passing day, with each passing hour, will somehow force israel to pull back and stop. if that's the calculation, i think it's the wrong one. i don't think it's going to work. i think the israelis are utterly determined to take shifa hospital, come what may. now behind you are some of the hillsides on whichjerusalem is built. what's the mood like among israeli politicians and the kind of people that write articles in newspapers? how worried are they? how much do they support netanyahu? the army is supported. society in a kind of way has also come together very supportive of those who were affected on 7 october but also very supportive of "our boys" in the military. all of that stops at the kind of door of the government, because the government is not popular. the prime minister is not popular. the government is seen as having been asleep at the wheel before 7 october. and there is also an uncertainty, and this has been reflected in polls, about exactly where this military campaign is going. what is the endgame? can anyone even see an endgame in sight? and so mr netanyahu is definitely a kind of beleaguered figure. and if he's not been knocked off course, where does the course take him? where does it take israel? all mr netanyahu has said so far is that israel would be in "complete security control". well, fine — the israeli army can probably go in and patrol the streets, the shattered streets of the gaza strip for some indefinite period. but what then? who is actually going to rule gaza? now obviously not hamas. but what about the other palestinian authority, if you like, the palestinian authority based in ramallah in the west bank? well, antony blinken and others have said the pa will have a significant role in the future governance of gaza. the other night, mr netanyahu said, no, it won't. this is a leadership that has yet to condemn the attacks of 7 october. it will not be the pa. well, who then? some kind of international coalition? who on earth are we going to find who's willing to rule the gaza strip after all this is over? i mean, you do hear people talking about "buffer zones", a few on the far—right fringes, talking about reoccupying gaza with jewish settlers, something the prime minister has said is not practical. but you don't really sense any kind of firm plan evolving, and it's going to be needed, you know, before very long. not all top level face—to—face meetings end well. in march 2021, the us secretary of state, antony blinken, met the chinese foreign minister in alaska. afterwards, both sides publicly denounced each other to the world's media. chinese—american relations were set back by the meeting. now, though, the atmosphere was very different at president biden�*s meeting with president xijinping in california. why the change? i asked celia hatton, the asia—pacific editor of bbc world service. xijinping and the men around him have looked around in the past year and realised that they've done too much to isolate china from the rest of the world. i think for a long time there was a feeling, an attitude almost, that china was so powerful it didn't really need allies in quite the same way that it once did. and i think it's misplayed its cards a little bit in that regard. so really, when you look at china's closest allies — you know, russia, north korea — that's not really a great club to be in at the moment. and i think while china was busy dealing with pandemic lockdowns and disruption inside china, we have to remember, john, it was only a year ago that we saw protests in 16 cities across china. protests against those ongoing covid lockdowns. while china was distracted with all of that, the united states had been quite busy. it had been building up alliances with australia and the uk, the aukus alliance. that's made china very nervous that australia is building, building those ties and really cosying up more militarily with the united states. just this week we saw japan, south korea and the united states announce even closer defence alliance than we've seen before. so i think this is all making china quite nervous, and it's realising that it's got to do more. of course, biden will must be determined to say to xi, "you've got to stop supporting russia as strongly as you do." what xi's response to that going to be? xijinping's priorities are really economic, and partly to do with, in terms of regional security. it's still a powerful nation and it still has pull when it comes to countries like russia, iran, and so that's really where i think the united states has realised it needs china, maybe in a way that it didn't need china five, ten years ago. and, of course, injust a matter of weeks, we've got an election in taiwan. i mean, we can assume, can't we, that president biden must have said to president xi, "you really cannot invade taiwan, "no matter what happens. " most people are looking at the calculations now and thinking that xijinping has probably lost his appetite to invade taiwan for now. i think that the tensions around taiwan have gone down a little bit. yes, we're looking towards this election in taiwan, and even though there's a frontrunner, the more pro—independence party, incumbent party is leading the polls right now, but, john, it's still up for grabs, and that's really why i think these talks between the us and china's leaders are so important right now, because taiwan is the big issue where they really could come to blows if it ever came to it. as we're talking about elections, we also have to mention the us election, which is coming up, of course, and i think it's really important. it was very important for the americans to have this meeting now between xi and biden, because president biden, like many other us politicians, will be getting pulled in to dragging china through the mud in the next coming year. i think the chinese side knows this, they can expect this, but if we're going to come to any kind of agreement, if we're going to lower tensions between the us and china, i think really the best hope is doing it now, before the us campaign cycle really kicks into high gear. but that's a really sophisticated approach by president biden and by antony blinken and so on, isn't it? i think so. i mean, i think they have to think in the long run, really. if donald trump gets into the white house again, then i think all bets are off, in terms of how he would handle his relationship with china. it was very up and down at the time. you know, it led to a really vicious trade war and the implementation of tariffs on both sides that are still in place. the chinese economy is really suffering at the moment. foreign investment into china is down for the first time in modern history. and so xijinping, you know, the economy is at the forefront of his mind. the united states is china's biggest threat, but it's also china's biggest customer, and they really need to do some good customer relations at the moment. they don't have the luxury of waiting to see who's going to win the us election. spain's interim prime minister, the socialist pedro sanchez, who's trying to form a government at the moment, has provoked rage among right—wing politicians and their supporters by trying to get catalonian separatists to back him. and the way he's going about it is to offer amnesties to a number of catalan politicians who were sentenced to jail for their part in the abortive independence bid of 2017. the problem is, mr sanchez has said, clearly and publicly, that amnesties of the kind he's now offering were illegal and wrong. so how does he justify his switch in tactics? i asked guy hedgecoe, a reporterfor the bbc in madrid. the argument he makes is that he's doing this because it will improve coexistence, as he puts it, in catalonia. it will improve the atmosphere among catalans, and it will reduce those tensions that catalonia has been seeing really over the last decade, but particularly since 2017, when the region made that failed bid to break away from spain. and what mr sanchez says is "throughout my tenure, "i've been trying to reduce those tensions "by taking various measures." now, previously, he has, for example, issued a pardon for nine catalan prisoners. he also introduced a reform of the criminal code, which benefited some catalans facing legal charges as well, to an extent. so he's taken previous measures. and i think it's fair to say that those measures, certainly the pardons, were fairly successful in reducing tensions. he says he's doing the same thing once again, that this is a long standing grievance, this idea of wanting an amnesty that the nationalists have had, and he's now providing it. he has argued that simply, that circumstances are dictating this, because the alternative to him introducing this amnesty law and forming a new government would be elections injanuary, and the possibility of the right coming into power, including the far—right. including the far right. so he's been kind of using that as a warning. and how are the two main catalan parties that he's negotiating with over all this, how are they taking it? well, i think they see this as a step forward. of course, the ultimate ambition for both these parties is independence for catalonia. you have the catalan republican left, which is the party which is governing catalonia at the moment, a minority government. and they have already been engaged with madrid over the last couple of years. and they argue that they have made gains for the nationalist cause by doing that. now, the other party involved in this, the other nationalist party, together for catalonia, has been in a very different situation, because their most visible figure, carles puigdemont, has been in self—imposed exile for the last six years. he's been a kind of outsider figure, and his party has almost been the sort of outsider party, which has been saying, "we mustn't engage with madrid, "we can't trust madrid. "they've let us down in the past. they'll do it again", and insisting that the only way to get independence for catalonia is this unilateral route, that route that they went down in 2017. now, the change that we've seen over the last few days is that together for catalonia, carlos puigdemont�*s party, has now kind of come back into the spanish political arena. it's now agreeing to get involved in day—to—day politics in madrid. it's agreeing to support pedro sanchez�*s government. for how long, we don't know. guy, give me your own view of whether you think that the nationalists in catalonia are closer now to independence, or would be closer as a result of doing this deal. i think it's still a long way off. it's very difficult to tell, because the catalan crisis, which exploded in 2017, it really had seemed to sort of calm down over the last few years. but the next step along that road would, of course, be a binding referendum on independence in catalonia, a scotland style referendum, if you like, which they talk about a lot. that's something that both the catalan nationalist parties want, and it's something that pedro sanchez has repeatedly said he would never grant. he says it's unconstitutional. he says itjust couldn't be allowed. now, remember, he said that same thing about this amnesty as well. so i think a lot of people are wondering if pedro sanchez changed his mind about the amnesty, why wouldn't he change his mind about the referendum? possibly catalan nationalists are thinking the same thing. thank you very much. no, not at all. one of the more memorable and exciting moments in my career was slipping illegally into the repressive dictatorship of myanmar in 2010, i was there to report on the release, after seven years of house arrest, of aung san suu kyi, the opposition leader. since those heady days, the lady, as she's universally known in myanmar, has had a majorfall in international approval, and after a short period as the country's elected prime minister, she was overthrown by the military and sentenced to a total of 33 years imprisonment. but the generals who seized power in the country again haven't been able to control it, and now they're facing the possibility of defeat in a number of interlinked rebellions around the country. i asked moe myint, of the bbc�*s burmese service, to explain. this is quite extraordinary. this has never happened before in this country... ..on this massive scale of coordinated attacks by ethnic armies. usually they operate in their own areas, but now they are expanding, and they have controlled almost all their land routes to china, and they have captured major border towns. so these are quite strategic towns for them, as well as for burmese military. and these are ethnic groups, like the karen and the chin, various groups like that, are they? yeah. myanmar has more than 20 ethnic armies in the country. in the north, we have kachin bordering china, and in the west we have arakan and chin armies. in the south, bordering thailand, we have karen and karenni armies. so they have been fighting burmese army for seven decades, but previously they operate in their own area and they fight for more autonomy in their regions. but these days they have become united, you know, they've got together with other anti—coup militia groups around the country. and this is all really because of the 2021 coup that brought the military government to power. you're right. they have been waiting for this time. they have been planning this attack, but they didn't have this unity before. but at the same time, on the other hand, the military is quite stretched, because they face many fronts, you know, around the country and on the ground. they are losing control of many areas, very recently in the past two weeks. how likely is it, do you think, that myanmar might become a democracy again? many people believe, you know, these fighting may not bring down the militaryjunta, but there will be a time for these people to come and talk together, to a dialogue. how likely is it that aung san suu kyi herself will come back and be the leader of myanmar again? aung san suu kyi has been out of public scene since the coup in 2021, so she has now been jailed to 33 years in prison. but do you think that these, these various groups might support her, or is that irrelevant to...? really, they support her. but things have changed since the coup, and we don't know if aung san suu kyi would approve there armed rebellions. she always says she wants peaceful ways and non—violence ways. but aung san suu kyi will play a role definitely when she is released, whenever there is a situation for the military, when they are in a crisis situation, they always... ..talk to the lady, you know, in the past. but then there will be a dialogue, and then the country can change again, you know, to the democracy. but it's very difficult at the moment to say when that time will come. moe myint myint of the bbc burmese service. if, as i have, you've watched over the years as serious fighting has broken out between israel and its neighbours, you can see a definite pattern. at first, when israel has come under attack, there's been sympathy and support in western countries, stronger than ever in this case, when the hamas attack was carried out with such brutality against people who are often only in the area because they longed for peace. but then israel hits back, using the weapons of a first world power against mostly defenceless targets. and the civilian death toll begins to rise. our television screens are filled with pictures of what the poet wilfred owen called "the pity of war". children injured, widows crying, heaped up bodies in corridors and streets. and public opinion in the west starts to shift. a top israeli ex—soldier, with political links, said to me, "it's always a race between how much we can get done," by which he meant by destroying israel's enemies and their infrastructure, "and how quickly the outside world starts to yell at us." we're at that point now, and in this respect, the gaza war�*s different from previous ones, because the demographics are changing in america, as they already have in the countries of western europe. at the moment, you get the impression that the