0 in the attack on the 26. >> in classified, i'd like to know that. i don't understand. i went to union public high school 1100. my math. 11,015,000 u.s. citizens. that leaves thousands, not hungry left -- not hundreds left. we have people calling us wanting to get out, u.s. citizens not allowed to get in the gate or kicked off the base are not allowed out. we have to get our folks home. i yield back. thank you. mr. chairman. >> general milley come i want to thank you for your 42 years of service, your principled commitment to civilian rule, for your commitment to military to military communication that kept this country safe for three decades during the cold war and for the sacrifice and patriotism that you and your family have shown. as the son of immigrants, i am and your families debt and i want to thank the three of you for ending america's longest war and executing the longest airlifting history. secretary austin camille testified that troops stayed past the deadline. the military would likely have needed reinforcements. i want to make this clear. the choice for president biden wasn't zero troops or 2500 troops. it was zero troops or potentially many more troops. general milley briefly, would you agree that at some point more than 2500 folks would have been needed as the taliban engaged in offensive strikes? >> reasonable prospect we would've had to increase forces past 2500 given that the taliban were very likely going to start attacking us. there is a range of forces. we are talking about 2500 or 4500. >> i want to talk about the strike that killed civilians. i think our military cares more about the loss of civilian life than any military in the world, any superpower ever in history that's why i think we ought to talk about it. i brought pictures of the seven children who were killed along with three adults to remind us this is not one america wants. this is something that we need to prevent in the future. press secretary kirby who did a fine job during those ten days said you would support evacuating these family members as they have requested and resettling them in the u.s. is that correct, secretary austin? >> it is. >> can we get the families and the coworkers evacuated now and brought to safety? could that happen? can we get them into the u.s. or some safe place? >> will continue to work through state department channels to engage the family and if they desire to leave and we will certainly do everything we can to facilitate getting them out. >> i hope we can expedite that and expedite the compensation. it is the moral thing to do, the right thing to do. it's how america conducts itself so i hope you will take that into consideration. general mckenzie, i admire and respect your leadership but i want to see how we can improve the intelligence to prevent these kind of strikes in the future. one aspect you said is that there was a white toyota corolla. i'm sure you're aware, is there any car more common than a toyota corolla? >> it's a very common car. of course there were many other factors that went into that decision. >> according to the stars & stripes, roughly 90% of cars registered in afghanistan have been corollas. one of the of the things that me most on my reading and obviously you know more, the corolla was parked next to a u.s. registered calpurnia-based ngo that was delivering humanitarian assistance. i guess the question is, did the dod know about the ngo in advance of the strike? >> i would prefer, since it's under investigation, i would like to defer that question. >> i would hope that we can make sure going forward that our department will cross-check intelligence to make sure that aid organizations are on no strike lists. i assume that there is -- if there is an aid organization or hospital they are on no strike lists. >> as our mosques, often used as training sites as well. >> i believe our military goes through extra ordinary lengths to prevent this. it's not to be an indictment of anyone. i want to make sure we continue to improve the processes and that we right by the families who suffered this unspeakable tragedy. thinking get into the three of you for your leadership and thank you to everyone who served. regardless of one's view in afghanistan, i find your integrity and patriotism -- a dishonor to this committee and a dishonor to your service. >> i have to ask the witnesses question. there is a complicated scheduling thing on. my plan would be if we could go to that. period, take a break then. but it's been a while. if you need a break earlier. we can take a 15 minute break at 12:30 and i wish there was an easier way to do this. it's totally up to you. would you like to break at 12:30 or just go? >> i think we are good for right now, chairman. >> if you need a break. >> fire the star cluster. >> we all have overprotective aids. that they need a break, they need a break. mr. gallagher is recognized for 5 minutes. >> general mckenzie, "the washington post" reported on august 20th at the taliban offered to allow the u.s. military to take responsibility for security at kabul. did you meet to discuss such an offer? >> i met with him on doha and doha. we were attempting a withdrawal. >> having security over all of kabul. >> he said why don't you take security for all of kabul. that's not why was there. that was not my instruction. we did not have resources to undertake it. >> did you convey the offer to the president? >> the offer was made to the president's special representative to afghanistan. >> do you know if it was conveyed to the president? >> i don't know. >> who made the decision to turn down the taliban offer to allow the u.s. military to secure kabul? >> i did not consider to be a formal offer and it was not the reason i was there so i do not pursue it. if someone made a decision, that would have been made. >> we don't know. >> i do know that it was conveyed to my chain of command. >> in military terms, what you call the retreat of military forces under security provided by and with the permission of enemy forces? >> i don't know. i've never done one of those operations. >> i think you just did. >> i disagree. >> you did not withdraw forces from afghanistan after a negotiation with the taliban? >> that's correct. we did not do that. >> this would not be a conditional surrender, your opinion? >> it would not be. i would describe it as a noncombatant evacuation operation that we conducted with our timing our forces and we warned the taliban that if they interfere with the operation we would strike them hard. they chose not to interfere with that operation. >> you are saying that the meeting and doha was to let the taliban know this is what we're doing. take it or leave it. but you are operating at that point under the agreement we had negotiated with the taliban for the surrender, right? the doha agreement. >> i was there to tell the taliban we were conducting the noncombatant evacuation operation. >> by dod definition, it does not include the evacuation of combatants. you are also evacuating combatants. >> you're wrong. when i met with the taliban on 15 august, we had completed the withdrawal operation. for the forces that women were forces that were -- the insertion and extraction of combat and forces. >> what do we call the withdrawal of combatants? >> it can be called a retrograde period >> was it in your orders? or you're you tasked with doing? >> tasked with conducting noncombatant evacuation operation. >> what you just said -- what is the tasking to withdraw the forces? >> i would have to take a look. i believe it was "a withdrawal." >> i believe the definition is a repositioning of forces. i would call it a conditional surrender. something general milley said, has al qaeda sworn to the taliban? >> i believe there's a deep commitment. i couldn't answer that question. >> i believe general milley said before. has the taliban renounced the previous oath al qaeda had sworn? >> the taliban and al qaeda have a very close relationship and i don't expect the taliban to seriously interfere with repositioning in afghanistan which i think is what you're asking. >> the new interior minister for the taliban government is a known al qaeda associate. is there any evidence that he or the haqqani network has broken with al qaeda? >> no. >> did the march attack breach the doha agreement in your opinion? >> no, it did not. >> it did not. general mckenzie, do you know which taliban forces were providing security in front of the airport? >> yes, we do. >> was it 313? >> there were other elements. they were part of it. a hodgepodge of units. among others. >> suicide bombing attacks. have the suicide bomber -- i think you suggested to the congressman that this person might've been imprisoned. do we know? do we know whether he had been? >> we are working hard to find out where the suicide bomber came from. >> did we have an opportunity to take them out prior to the suicide bomber attack? >> we did not. >> does the over the horizon posture that we are adopted, will it require -- will be more or less difficult now that we are out of the country? >> eyes set on the record it would be difficult to do, not impossible. >> time is expired. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general mckenzie, you said reports about you engaging with the taliban, about a redline around kabul were false. does that mean there was no discussion or consideration and in the u.s. for a plan to defend kabul in early august before the fall? >> there was never a discussion about a plan to defend kabul before its fall. i will say that when i went to doha, i took with me a graphic, map of kabul with a 30-kilometer ring on the outside. the original proposal was we would ask the taliban to staff that side -- stay outside that ring. on the data meeting, they were already in downtown kabul. the graphic was outdated. had to proceed from the new reality. >> secretary austin, i wanted to get your thoughts. when i spent some time in the situation room with you in 2014 when we were fearing the fall of baghdad, the u.s. commander was defending those position using air assets. the effort was to buy time for the iraqis. did it not cross your mind to consider something like that in early august before the fall of kabul? >> this is certainly something we considered. we took a look at what we would need to do to protect the embassy and if we had to do a neo, what could we do to buy time? >> chairman millie, yesterday you said you were asked on august 25th to make a decision about the august 31st deadline. was there a formal request made to the taliban by the united states to stay passed august 31st? was it a request that we denied that you were taking into account and that decision? >> i don't make decisions. i provide -- >> in your recommendation. >> best military advice. i'm not aware of a formal request to the taliban one way or the other. staying past the 31st. i'm very familiar with the advice we provided on the 25th. >> before the fall of kabul, did we have formal taliban agreement upon an august 31st date? >> i'm not sure what you mean by formal. >> have there ever been a point where the united states went to the taliban saying that we are leaving august 31st. prior to the fall of kabul. >> from a policy perspective, we could give you the detailed information. i believe the taliban new that we were departing on the 31st. >> you weren't aware -- >> a formal agreement per se. >> general mckenzie, you are saying that you talked to the taliban on august 15. did you use august 31st as the date to end operations? was there a date set at all? >> i did not use a specific date when i talk to them. >> no date was set on august 15. >> i didn't convey a specific date as part of my conversation. >> i wanted to switch gears one more time. secretary austin moved. when we are looking at the fundamental viability of the over the horizon effort, is the airspace over afghanistan currently considered sovereign airspace? i will frame it in a slightly different way. is it currently illegal for the united states to conduct isr's worthies and air strikes in afghanistan? >> yes. >> under what authority? >> the same authorities we were using before. >> under the security and defense cooperation agreement of 2014? is that correct? >> no. what we are prosecuting now is, are the authorities that were referred to by general mckenzie earlier and he mentioned he would have to take that into a classified setting. >> okay. i will certainly follow with you. general mckenzie, something i wanted to follow-up with you on. yesterday in your hearing from the senate, he made a comment when asked about the war on terror. he said the war on terror is not over but then you also went on and said that the war in afghanistan is not over. i wanted to clarify. one of the clarification from you and your opinion. is the war in afghanistan over? >> i believe the war in afghanistan is not over. we are no longer a party to that war but that doesn't mean isis and the taliban aren't going to engage in a furious fight this fall that may result in ice is being crushed or it may result -- >> i see. you are referring, you believe that there's a civil war in afghanistan but in terms of the united states war against afghanistan, you would say that that is over. >> we have no forces in afghanistan. our only interest in afghanistan is looking for isis-k in al qaeda targets. >> chairman gates is recognized. >> february 26, 2020. house armed services committee, general mark milley. "we know we're not going to defeat the taliban militarily and they are not going to defeat the government of afghanistan militarily." you really blew that call, didn't you, general? >> i believe it was an issue of strategic stalemate and then had we remained in afghanistan with the advisory levels of effort within the government of afghanistan -- >> that's interesting but it's not what i asked. you spent more time with bob woodward on this book then you spent analyzing the very likely prospect that the afghanistan government was going to fall immediately to the taliban. >> not even close, congressman. >> oh, really? you said after kabul felt no one could have anticipated the immediate fall of the ghani government. when did you become aware joe biden trying to get ghani to lie about conditions in afghanistan. he did that in july. do you know that? >> i'm not aware of president biden -- >> you're not aware of the phone call that biden had with ghani where he said whether it's true or not, we want you to paint a rosy picture. you the chief military advisor to the president. you said that the taliban was not going to defeat the government of afghanistan militarily. the resident tries to get ghani to lie. >> the two things, if i may. what i said was the situation was stalemate and if we kept advisors there, the government of afghanistan and the army would've still been there. that's what i said. whether that's right or wrong, i don't know. >> it seems wrong now. >> we withdrew. >> secretary austin, are you capable of assessing whether another has the will to fight? >> noel, we are not. that's the point that the chairman made earlier. >> it's and incredibly disappointing thing that the secretary of defense for simply to say i can't assess whether someone has the will to fight but it's consistent with your record. during the obama administration i think they gave you $48 million to train up some folks in syria to take on the assad government and i think your testimony was that only four or five survive first contact with the enemy. what confidence should this committee have in you or should the country avenue when you've now confessed to us and whether it's the swing and miss in afghanistan that general milley talked about yesterday. total failure. or whether it was your failures in syria. you don't seem capable to look at a fighting force and determine whether or not they have the will. is that an embarrassment? >> if you'll recall, the end result was the sdf we stood up that was very, very instrumental in turning the tide of battle in syria. >> oh, yeah, turned it so much you got assad and power in syria and you've got the taliban and power in afghanistan. where have you been? >> the focus was isis, congressman. those forces had significant effect on the isis network. >> it seems like you are chronically bad at this and you have admitted that i guess, which is, to your credit. when people in the military like lieutenant colonel stuart schaller stand up and demand accountability, when they say that you screwed up, they point out that general milley statement of the government afghanistan is not going to get defeated by the taliban. he ends up in the brig and you all end up in front of us and your former employer, raytheon, ends up with a lot of money. we have poured cash and blood and credibility into a ghani government that was a mirage. it fell immediately. while the guy sitting next to you was off talking to phil rucker and talking doing his thing with bob woodward, we were buying into the big lie. the big lie that this was ever going to be successful and we could ever rely on the afghanistan government for anything at all. general milley, you kind of gave up the game earlier when he said he wanted to address elements of your personal conduct that were in question. we are not questioning your personal conduct. we are questioning in your official capacity going and undermining the chain of command which is obviously what you did. you have created this whole -- >> did not undermine the chain of command. >> you absolutely did. >> did not. >> you said yesterday that you weren't going to resign when senators asked you this question. i believe that you probably won't resign. you seem to be very happy sailing up over there. if we didn't have a president was so adult, you all would be fired. that you deserve. you've let down people who wear the uniform in my district and all around the country and you are far more interested in what your perception is and how people think about you an insider washington books and you care about winning. >> time has expired. >> thank you, mr. chair. gentlemen, i apologize for the behavior of my colleagues. i am deeply, deeply appreciative of your service and of the decades of experience that you will bring to this conversation. thank you so much for the opportunity to ask important questions of you, questions that ought to be asked of you in the spirit of our responsibility of oversight rather than provocation. i just have a couple questions of clarification from testimony that has happened so far the first one is for you, general mckenzie. you mention something in the opening remarks about you having looked at different branches to account for the complete collapse of the government and the afghan military. that's the first time i have heard that scenario being articulated out loud. most of the testimony that i have heard prior to this has been we could have never foreseen that. a somebody -- as a branching engineer type person, that's what i do. it's intrigued. >> as we drew up the neo plan, one of the assumptions of the neo plan was that the afghan military would be able to continue to secure the airfield. the turks were there but they only actually secured a small fraction of the airfield. the rest of the long perimeter around the runway was secured by afghan military forces. our assumption was that they would continue to perform that function. but since we stated that as an assumption by the way we planned, we have to say if that assumption is wrong because an assumption is a future hypothetical condition we believe is going to occur, we felt that was always something we should challenge. we developed a plan if that assumption failed, if they melted away. we had a branch plan developed as part of the overall plan where we would introduce adequate combat forces to physically take over securing the perimete