0 ahead of that messaging before the science had before that regulators were on the same page with them. >> john: , and on the immigration front, the mayor of del rio, texas, is on the extraordinary pictures. they declared a state of emergency in his town. thanks for being with us on this friday >> martha: thanks, john and jacqui. a lot of breaking news. i'm martha maccallum in new york. any moment now, there you can see the podium is set up at the pentagon. a huge development breaking right now as we are told that officials are about to announce that no isis-k fighters were killed in the august 29th u.s. drone strike in kabul that killed ten civilians in fact. there's no disciplinary action we're told expected as a result of that obvious misstep, mistake, whatever you want to call it. a lot of questions moments away about what happened with what was said to be a great example of our over-the-horizon ability to take out targets in afghanistan despite the fact that we pulled out. so there's a lot to cover there as well as other big news reported on these back-channel calls with general mark milley and his chinese counterpart that president trump didn't know about. assuring the chinese that we wouldn't attack and promising that there would be a warning if we did, according to that reporting. congressman michael waltz is going to join us. he's watching this and he's calling for a briefing with regard to that specifically, to get to the bottom of what happened in those calls. i'm going to ask you to stand by. we'll meet you on the other side as we wait for john kirby. let's listen in. >> opening comments for you, that -- related to the august 29th air strike in kabul. he will stick around for questions. i'll moderate the questions as we have done before. since we got a full house here and he's had limited time, i'd ask you to keep your follows to a absolute minimum so that we can be as fair as we can to everybody. when the general is done, i'll come back and brief on some other topics as well. with that, general mckenzie, can you hear and see me? >> i'll see you fine. thanks. i'll turn the floor over to you. >> good afternoon. i'm here to brief the results of the investigation i directed following the report of civilian casualties from the strike of kabul 29 august. having reviewed the findings of the investigation and the supporting of analysis, i'm now convinced that as many as ten civilians including up to seven children were tragically killed in that strike. moreover, we assess that it is unlikely that the vehicle and those that died were associated with isis-k or a direct threat to u.s. forces. i offer my condolences to the family and friends of those killed. this strike was taken in the earnest belief that it would prevent an imminent threat to forces at the airport. it was a mistake and i offer my sincere apology. as a commander, i'm fully responsible for this strike and its tragic outcome. while i have begun with the most important findings, i do want to provide the background leading up to the strike and include an explanation as to why we felt reasonably settle that this was a legitimate strike on an imminent isis-k threat with no indication that the strike would result in civilian casualties as we asserted in our initial statements. the strike must be considered in the context of the situation on the ground in kabul at a hamed karzai airport that resulted in the death of 13 sailors and marines and more than 100 civilians on august 26. also with a substantial body of intelligence indicating the immense of another attack, in the 48 hours prior to the strike, sensitive intelligence indicated that the compound at point number 1 on the map -- let's bring the map up, please. we're going to bring this up. hopefully you have an opportunity to see it. john, can you see the map there? john, can you hear me now? >> the press has hard copies. >> roger. i'm going to continue based on that then, john. in the 48 hours prior to the strike, sensitive intelligence indicated point number 1 was being used by isis-k planners used to facilitate future attacks. we also received a significant number of reports indicating multiple avenues of attack planned simultaneously in which isis-k would attempt to harm our forces including with rockets, suicide explosive vests and vehicle-borne ieuds. our leaders on the ground and in the strike cell received more than 60 different pieces of intelligence related to imminent threats were some corroborating and some conflicting. one of the most recurring aspects of the intelligence was that isis-k would utilize a white toyota corolla as a key element in the next attack. because the compound at point number 1 was our strongest lead for this series of imminent attacks, we initiated an intense surveillance with as many as six mqn reapers on the morning of 29 august. at 8:52 a.m. local time on 29 august, a white toyota corolla arrived at point number 1, the compound we believed to be a key area of interest associated with imminent threats to the airport. two adult males exited the vehicle, met with an adult male in the compound and received a bag from him. the corolla departed the compound heading south and we followed the vehicle. at 9:05 a.m., the toyota corolla picked up a third adult male carrying a bag at point number 2 and continued south. 9:35, the corolla arrived at the compound at point number 3, which we now know to include an office of nutrition and education internationally. all three adult males entered the building on the compound. at 11:19 a.m., three adult males unloaded bags and jugs from the trunk of the vehicle before departing the compound at 11:22 a.m. heading south. at approximately this time, u.s. forces were notified of a sensitive intelligence collection indicating that an isis-k cell leader in kabul was dropping off supplies. at 12:11 p.m., the corolla arrived at point number 4. at least two adult males exited the vehicle in front of an office building before returning to the vehicle and departing at 1:27 p.m. heading west and then south. 2:00 p.m., the corolla returned to the compound at point number 3. subsequently multiple adult males were observed leading the trunk of the vehicle with items assessed at the time the be explosives. before departing at 3:47 p.m. with four adult males heading north. 4:07, the corolla dropped off one adult male carrying a bag and continued north. after driving near point number 1, the corolla dropped off one adult male at point number 5, which is several hundred meters north of point number 1. at 4:39 p.m., the corolla dropped off its last passenger. at 4:51, the corolla backed into a compound that was three kilometers from the airport. which was the closest it came to the airport all day. we were concerned that the vehicle could move quickly and beat the airport boundary in moments. we observed the vehicle eight hours. while in the compound, the vehicle was observed being approached by a single adult male assessed to be a co conspirator. the strike was executed at this time because the vehicle was stationary and released the potential for civilian casualties. a single hellfire missile was fused inside the vehicle. it struck the vehicle at 4:53 p.m., which produced an explosive event and flames significantly larger than a hellfire missile would have produced. it's my assessment that we had achieved a reasonable certainty at the time of the strike to designate the vehicle as imminent threat at the airport and they made the self-defense strike with the correct established rules of engagement. that assessment is based on interviews with leaders on the ground and members of the strike cell on a review of the intelligence available to the team at the time of the strike and on the team's interpretation of how this vehicle and its occupants' actions were confirming the intelligence that they were seeing. it is further my assessment that the strike team were convinced at the time of the strike that the area was clear of civilians and that they had taken prudent steps in regard to weaponeering the strike the potential for civilian casualties. finally, it's my assessment that they believed as reported that there was a secondary explosion. our investigation now concludes that the strike was a tragic mistake. first, i will stress this was not a rushed strike. the strike cell deliberately followed and observed this vehicle and its occupants for eight hours while cross-checking what they were looking at to develop a reasonable certainty of the threat that is vehicle posed to our forces. second, while the initial reports indicate add secondary explosion, the initial investigation said there was probable accelerants that could include explosive material in the vehicle or ignition of a gas tank of the vehicle. subsequent analysis could not rule out a small amount of explosive material but determined the most likely cause was the ignition of gas from a propane tank located behind the car. that would created the massive fireball out of the compound observed in the video and displayed in this photo. next photo, please. finally -- john, can you hear me? >> i got you. >> roger. while the strike cell reported the presence of two adult males, one inside the vehicle and one outside the vehicle at the time of the strike, the cell initiated a review of the footage immediately following the report of civilian casualties and determined that a few partially object cured forms were briefly visible moving in the compound. this led to my initiation of an investigation within 24 hours of the strike. a comprehensive review of all the available footage and reporting on the matter led to us a final conclusion that as many as ten civilians were killed in the strike including up to seven children. at the time of the strike, based upon all the intelligence and what was being reported, i was confident that the vehicle had averted an i'ment threat to the forces at the airport. based on that assessment, i and other leaders asserted the validity of the strike. i'm here to acknowledge our mistakes. i will end my remarks with the same note of sincere and profound condolences the family and friends of those that died in this tragic strike. we're exploring the possibility of payments. i'll finish by saying while the team conducted the strike, they were trying to prevent an attack on our forces and innocent evacuees. we understand that to be incorrect. with that i'm ready to take your questions. >> thank you, general. tom? >> general, this is a complete and utter failure. can you explain how this possibly could have happened? >> well, this particular strike was a terrible mistake. we certainly regret that. i've been very clear that we take full responsibility for it. at the same time, we were carrying on a number of complex operations designed to defend ourselves. we conducted a strike a couple days before that was very successful. we conducted other operations across the battle space to defend ourselves in this difficult 48-hour period when so many imminent threats were manifest. while i agree with it, it did not come up to our standards and i regret it. i would not qualify the entire operation in those terms. >> will anybody be held responsible? >> we're in the process right now of continuing that line of investigation. i have nothing for you now because that involved personnel issues. >> please identify yourself and your outlet. >> cbs news. you said that the -- you started following this car after it showed up at a place associated with isis. in retrospect, was that place associated with isis? this was described as an over-the-horizon strike, which is what the u.s. is going to be relying on from now on in afghanistan. so what does this incident say about the reliability of future strikes against terrorist threats in afghanistan? >> i'll take the first part and begin with that. is a point 1 on the map, we assess associated with isis-k. in fact, less than 24 hours later, rockets will be launched. we had really good intelligence to think that point 1 is where isis was centered. that was a very good intelligence in support of that belief. now, the second part of your question about whether this is -- whether this will affect future operations. this is a self-defense strike taken under self-defense rules of engagement based on an i'ment threat to attack us. it's not the way we would strike in an ota mission going to afghanistan against isis-k targets. that won't be a self-defense strike. it will be done under different rules of engagement. we'll have more opportunity probably than we had under this extreme time pressure to take a look at the target. to use phrase that you'll be familiar, to have an opportunity to develop extended pattern of life. none of these were available given to us the urgent and pressing nature of the eminent threat to our forces. >> what does this say to you about the over-the-horizon capability that we've been hearing about? what are the risks involved when you don't have people on the ground going forward? >> sure. as i said in my statement, we're considering reparations for this and that will be a matter for policy. we're in consultation with the office of the secretary of defense to see forward there. it's difficult to reach out on the ground in afghanistan to reach people. but we're very interested in doing that and we'll move on it based on our ability to do that. i'll echo what i said today. again, we'll have an opportunity to further develop the target in time, look at pattern of life. that time was not available to us because this was eminent threat to our forces. we did not have the luxury of time to develop pattern of life and other things. we struck under the theory of reasonable certainty. probably our strikes in afghanistan going forward will be under a higher standard, a policy matter, not a pure military matter. i don't think you should draw any conclusions about how to strike in afghanistan against isis targets based on this particular strike. >> you said that you had intelligence about a threat emanating from the white toyota. so this intelligence was not good or there was another white toyota that was dangerous and nothing happened from another white toyota. >> so i would say this. clearly our intelligence was wrong on this particular white toyota corolla. at the same time, we understood a variety of things that make it hard for them to get at us during this period of time. we close the gates, which we department want to do during this period of time. force protection. we were very active with our overhead, which is -- often has a suppressive effect on their activities. we still took rockets the next day. they fired the rockets from your point and from other places. i would say unequivocally in this case, clearly the intelligence was wrong on this vehicle. we certainly regret that as i've been clear. >> go to the phones. jennifer, "new york times." jennifer, you there? >> my question is on a different matter, john, for after this. >> okay. louis martinez, abc. you there, louis? okay. nothing heard. nancy yusef. >> thank you. general, can you clarify a couple points? you followed the wrong protocol from the be beginning. that is you weren't following one vehicle and mistaken it for another one. in your initial statement, you said there's no initial reports of civilian casualties. it appears there's some concern very early on. so on what basis did you make that statement? finally, was there any intelligence that you were using to gather from the taliban? thank you. >> let me begin from the last question. nothing was gathered from the taliban. i should be clear about that. we selected this car based on its movement at a targeted area of interest to us. a known targeted area of interest. we held it throughout the day. based on the end result, that was a mistake. i have acknowledged that. >> megan? >> megan, military times. during this time were you tracking any other suspicious activity in kabul that might have been part of this threat and do you have any intelligence from after this drone strike that suggests what happened to the eminent threat after ward? >> sure. as i noted in my comments, we had over 60 very, very high caliber reports of imminent threat to our forces in an around kabul. those are signals based. but they're also some human intelligence as well. we have a variety of sources for that intelligence. we believe that the strike we took a couple days prior in nangarhar had an effect on quietening down. we got a key attack planner that strike. we believe that disrespected their plans. additionally, we did things that made it harder to get to us. for example, we closed the gates. the gates as we know are a particular point where we're vulnerablech we decided not to provide people and hunkered down while the threat was there. so there were over 60 clear threat vectors that were dealing with during this period of time. including rocket attacks that occurred after this from locations that are displayed on the graphic that you have. >> not in terms of the number of threats but other cars or groups of people that you were following that day, were you tracking anybody else closely? >> we tracked a lot of people. we didn't track anybody as closely as this because of the limitations on our resources. we thought this was a good lead. we were wrong. >> thanks, john. general mckenzie, cnn. you mentioned you saw shapes in the video that led you to believe that this necessitated an investigation that there could have been more civilians. september 1, we heard from general milley that called this a righteous strike. did you also believe this was a righteous strike and can you talk about your erosion of confidence over the next two weeks of the investigation? >> sure. i think we issued a statement from the central command about six hours after the strike acknowledging the possibility of civilian casualties. we knew from the beginning there was a possibility of civilian casualties. i think we still thought we had good reason to have taken that strike and it took us the gathering of facts to change that. we didn't think -- as you understand and appreciate, we didn't take the strike because we thought we were wrong. we took the strike because we thought we had a good target. it takes awhile to uncover those things. we move them as rapidly as we could. we worked extremely rapidly to get this information out and make it abdulmutallab. >> thank you, general. >> so despite numerous intelligence reports and warnings on the 26th, we had that tragic attack on the airport. 13 u.s. service members were killed in addition to tens of civilians. on the 29th, another tragedy took place. ten civilians killed, seven children. is that a failure of intelligence or leadership in afghanistan and what do you intend to do about that? thank you. >> i'll say that we had two events. the attack at abbey gate and this strike. in the abbey gate, you're in combat with the enemy. sometimes that enemy, the plans will work. you can't cover every eventuality all the time despite our best efforts to do that. we took every precaution we could. in fact, when we had threats develop over 48 hours that followed, we closed the gates in order to recognize it would reduce our ability to brings people in. at the same time, we thought it was the best thing that we could to reduce our attack surface, if you will, to protect our forces. also a number of attacks that were thwarted. these are two that you know about. they're high visibility and we're talking about them. others were thwarted and did not occur. the silence of the attacks should mean something, too. it's difficult to prove the negative. >> two quick questions. are you going to release the report of investigation. two, in your fact gathering, to what expect did you rely on "the new york times" as extensive video and the talks of ngos or civi