0 there's no doubt in my mind that our efforts prevented an attack on the homeland from afghanistan, which was our core original mission. and everyone who has served in that war has been proud. your service mattered. beginning in 2011, we steadily drew down our troop numbers, consolidated and closed bases and retrograded equipment from afghanistan. at the peak in 2011, we had 97,000 u.s. troops alongside 41,000 nato troops in afghanistan. ten years later, when ambassador calisade signed the agreement on 29, february, 2020, the united states had 12,600 u.s. troops with 8,000 nato and 10,500 contractors. this has been a ten-year multi-administration drawdown. not a 19-month or 19-day ne-yo. under the doha agreement, the u.s. would begin to withdraw its forces, contingent upon the taliban meeting certain conditions, which would lead to a political agreement between the taliban and the government of afghanistan. there were seven conditions applicable to the taliban and eight conditions applicable to the united states. while the taliban did not attack u.s. forces, which was one of the conditions, it failed to fully honor any, any other condition under the doha agreement. and perhaps most importantly, for u.s. national security, the taliban has never renounced al qaeda or broke its affiliation with them. we, the united states, adhered to every condition. in the fall of 2020, my analysis was that an accelerated withdrawal, without meeting specific and necessary conditions, risks losing the substantial gains made in afghanistan, damaging u.s. worldwide credibility and could precipitate a general collapse of the ansf, and the afghan government, resulting in a complete taliban takeover or general civil war. that was a year ago. my assessment remained consistent throughout. based on my advice and the advice of the commanders, then secretary of defense esper submitted a memorandum on 9 november, recommending to maintain u.s. forces at a level between about 2,500 and 4,500 in afghanistan, until conditions were met for further reduction. two days later, on 11 november 2020, i received an unclassified, signed order directing the united states military to withdrawal all forces from afghanistan, no later than 15 january 2021. after further discussions regarding the risks associated with such a withdrawal, the order was rescinded. on 17 november, we received a new order, to reduce levels to 2,500, plus enabling forces, no later than 15 january. when president biden was inaugurated, there were approximately 3,500 u.s. troops, 5,400 nato troops, and 6300 contractors in afghanistan, with a specified task of train, advise, and assist, along with a small contingent of counterterrorism forces. the strategic situation at inauguration was stalemate. the biden administration through the national security council process conducted a rigorous interagency review of the situation in afghanistan in february, march, and april. during this process, the views of the joint chiefs of staff, all of us, the centcom commander, general mckenzie, the u.s. 4a commander, general miller, and myself, were all given serious consideration by the administration. we provided a broad range of options and our assessment of their potential outcomes. the cost/benefit, risk to force, and risk to mission were evaluated againstives of the united states. on 14 april, the president announced his decision and the u.s. military received a change of mission to retrograde all u.s. military forces, maintain a small contingency force of 6 to 700 to protect the embassy in kabul, until the department of state could coordinate contractor security support. and also to assist turkey to maintain the karzai international airport and transition the u.s. military to an over the horizon counterterrorism support and security force assistance. it is clear, it is obvious that the war in afghanistan did not end on the terms we wanted, with the taliban now in power in kabul. although the neo was unprecedented as the largest air evacuation in history, evacuating 124,000 people, it came at an incredible cost of 11 marines, one soldier, and a navy corpsman. those 13 gave their lives so a people they never met will have an opportunity to live in freedom. and we must remember that the taliban was and remains a terrorist organization and they still have not broken ties with al qaeda. i have no allusions as to who we are dealing with. it remains to see if the taliban can consolidate power or the country will further fracture into civil war. but we must continue to protect the united states of america and its people from terrorist attacks coming from afghanistan. a reconstituted al qaeda or isis with aspirations to attack the united states is a very real possibility. and those conditions to include activity in ungoverned spaces could present themselves in the next 12 to 36 months. that mission will be much harder now, but not impossible. and we will continue to protect the american people. strategic decisions have strategic consequences. over the course of four presidents, 12 secretaries of defense, 7 chairman, 10 centcom commanders, 20 commanders in afghanistan, hundreds of congressional delegation visits, and 20 years of congressional oversight, there are many lessons to be learned. two specific to the military that we immediate to take a look at and we will is we did mirror image the development of the afghan national army, and the second the rapid -- the unprecedented rapid collapse of the afghan military in only 11 days in august. however, one lesson must never be forgot. every soldier, airmen, and marine who served there in afghanistan for 27 years protected our country from attack by terrorists. and for that, they should be forever proud and we should be forever grateful. thank you, chairman. if i could, i know there are some issues in the media that are of deep concern to many members on the committee, and with your permission, i would like to address those for a minute or two. again, i've submitted a memoranda for the committee to look at. >> you may proceed. >> mr. chairman, i've served this nation for 42 years. i've spent years in combat and i've buried a lot of my troops who died while defending this country. my loyalty to this nation, its people, and the constitution hasn't changed and will never change as long as i have breath to give. my loyalty is absolute and i will not turn my back on the fallen. with respect to the chinese calls, i routinely communicated with my counterpart, general lee, with the knowledge and coordination of civilian oversight. i am specifically directed to communicate with the chinese with department of defense guidance and a policy dialogue system. these military-to-military communications at the highest level are critical to the security of the united states in order to deconflict military actions, manage crisis, and prevent war between great powers that are armed with the world's most deadly weapons. the calls on 30 october and 8 january were coordinated before and after with secretary esper and acting secretary miller's staffs and the interagency. the specific purpose of the october and january calls were to generate -- or were generated by concerning intelligence, which caused us to believe that the chinese were worried about an attack on them by the united states. i know -- i am certain that president trump did not intend to attack the chinese. and it is my directed responsibility and it was my directed responsibility by the secretary to convey that intent to the chinese. my task at that time was to de-escalate. my message again was consistent. stay calm, steady, and de-escalate. we are not going to attack you. at secretary of defense esper's direction, i made a call to general lee on 30 october. eight people sat in that call with me and i read out the call within 30 minutes of the call ending. on 31 december, the chinese requested another call with me. the deputy assistant secretary of defense for asia pacific policy helped coordinate my call, which was then scheduled for 8 january, and he made a preliminary call on 6 january. 11 people attended that call with me and readouts of this call were distributed through the interagency that same day. shortly after my call ended with general lee, i personally informed both secretary of state pompeo and white house chief of staff meadows about the call among other topics. soon after that, i attended a meeting with acting secretary miller, where i briefed him on the call. later that same day, on 8 january, speaker of the house pelosi called me to inquire about the president's ability to launch nuclear weapons. i sought to assure her that nuclear launch is governed by a very specific and deliberate process. she was concerned and made very -- made various personal references characterizing the president. i explained to her that the president is the sole nuclear launch authority and he doesn't launch them alone. and that i am not qualified to determine the mental health of the president of the united states. there are processes, protocols, and procedures in place and i repeatedly assured her that there is no chance of an illegal, unauthorized, or accidental launch. by presidential directive and secretary of defense directive, the chairman is part of the process to ensure the president is fully informed when determining the use of the world's deadliest weapons. by law, i am not in the chain of command and i know that. however, by presidential directive and dod instruction, i am in the chain of communication to fulfill my legal statutory role as the president's primary military adviser. after the speaker pelosi call, i convened a short meeting in my office, with key members of my staff, to refresh all of us on the procedures which we practice daily at the action officer level. additionally, i immediately informed acting secretary of defense miller of speaker pelosi's phone call. at no time, was i attempting to change or influence the process, usurp authority or insert myself in the chain of command. but i am expected, i am required to give me advice and ensure that the president is fully informed on military matters. i am submitting for the record a detailed and classified memoranda and i welcome a walk-through on every one of these events and would be happy to talk about the intelligence that drove these calls. i'm also happy to make available any email, phone logs, memoranda, witnesses or anything else you need to understand these events. my oath is to support the constitution of the united states of america, against all enemies, foreign and domestic. i and will never turn my back on that oath. i firmly believe the civilian control of the military is a bedrock principle essential to the health of this public and i'm committed to ensuring that the military stays clear of military politics. >> thank you, general. general mckenzie, i understand you do not have a statement. that correct? >> i'll waive my statement in order to get us back on schedule. >> thank you very much, general. secretary larson, the doha agreement represents direct negotiations with terrorists, and not just negotiations, but an agreement with them that excluted the afghan government and the allies that have been fighting with us now since 9/11. it set a fixed departure date with conditions has been indicated were not really fold consistently by the taliban. as you considered in april what to do, did the intelligence suggest to you that reneging on departure of the troops would lead to significant attacks against american and allied military forces? >> chairman, to my recollection, the intelligence was clear that if we did not leave in accordance with that agreement, the taliban would recommence attacks on our forces. >> and they would include whatever attacks they could to attack american forces? >> that's correct. >> so the choice in many respects were, were we going to incur additional casualties indefinitely in afghanistan. that's one way to look at it. is that fair? >> that's correct, chairman. you would have to take additional measures to be able to defend yourself. now, general milley, and general mckenzie, did the doha agreement affect the moral of the afghan forces? ie, was there a sense now that even though it was months away, that the united states was leaving since we had agreed to leave? >> i'll let frank talk the details, but my assessment is yes, senator, it did affect the moral of the afghan security forces. >> general mckenzie? >> it's my adjustment that the doha agreement did negatively affect the performance of the afghan forces, in particular by some of the actions that the government of afghanistan was required to undertake as part of that agreement. >> and one of the critical issues was the agreement to withdraw contractors, which are basically the engine that maintains the air force of afghanistan and many other logistical operations. and that was just as critical as the troop departure, i would assume? >> it was. we had plans in place to try to conduct those operations from over the horizon. they were not as effective as having contractors on the ground, on site with the aircraft. >> the momentum appeared to be shifting to the taliban. indications were their penetration or parts of the country in the northern sections, particularly which traditionally opposed the taliban, the northern alliance. and that started -- to be fair, that started long before doha. there are some commentators who have suggested that since 2014, the taliban have been surrounding provincial capitals, insinuating themselves into the politics of the local communities, striking bargains. is that your impression, too, general mckenzie? >> i think it is a good assessment, from 2014 on, the taliban did pursue that strategy, and they had some success. and the government of afghanistan also had success, holding on to centralized urban areas and population centers. but the taliban pursued a distinct strategy and had some success with it. >> now, general -- excuse me, secretary austin, you did provide your best military advice to the president regarding the situation in afghanistan, and as has been recounted several times, there were multiple meetings and he received advice from many different quarters. do you feel that you have the opportunity to make your advice very clear? >> i do, chairman. and as i've said before, i always keep my advice to the president confidential. but i am very much satisfied that we had a thorough policy review and i believe that all of the parties had an opportunity to provide input and that input was received. >> thank you very much. senator inhofe? >> thank you, mr. chairman. it was two weeks ago that we had a closed, classified hearing. we had general miller's recommendation at that time. let me, first of all, just mention that during their confirmation process, you committed -- and i'm speaking now to general mckenzie and general milley, to giving your honest and personal views to this committee, even if those views were different from those of the administration and i'm confident that you will be doing that. during this hearing that we had, we -- it was emphasized to us, from general miller, that we -- that he was recommending the 2,500 troops in afghanistan. now, we didn't receive the documentation from your offices. i say to the witnesses today, until, actually, 10:35 last night. so there really wasn't time to get into a lot of the details. but i would ask general mckenzie, did you agree to the recommendation that general miller had two weeks ago? >> senator, again, i won't share my personal recommendation with the president, but i will give you my honest opinion. and my honest opinion and view shaped my recommendation. i recommend that we maintain 2,500 troops in afghanistan. and i also recommended earlier in the fall of 2020, that we maintain 4,500 at that time. those were my personal views. i also have a view that the withdrawal of those forces would lead inevitably to the collapse of the afghan military forces, and eventually, the afghan government. >> i understand that. and general milley, i assume you agree with that in terms of the recommendation of 2,500? >> what i said in my opening statement and the memoranda that i wrote back in the fall of 2020 remained consistent, and i do agree with that. >> this committee is unsure as to whether or not general miller's recommendation ever got to the president. obviously, there were conversations with the president, but i would like to ask, even though general mckenzie, i think you've all made this statement, did you talk to the president about general miller's recommendation? >> sir, i was present when that discussion occurred. >> mm-hmm. >> and i'm confident that the president heard all of the recommendations and listened to them very thoughtfully. >> so one of the recommendations that was made by the three of you would be the recommendation that was originally made my general miller's two weeks ago. >> during the august 18th interview on abc, george stepnopoulos asked president biden whether u.s. troops would stay beyond august 31st if there were still americans to evacuate. president biden responded, and this is a quote, if there's american citizens left, we're going to stay to get them all out. this didn't happen. president biden's decision resulted in all of the troops leaving, but the american citizens are still trying to get out. how many american citizens is it your opinion are still there? just go down the line, each one of you. anyone? >> senator, i would defer to the state department for that assessment. that's a dynamic process. they've been contacting the civilians that are in afghanistan and again, i would defer to them for definitive numbers. >> go ahead. others? >> same, as the secretary just said. there were numbers at the beginning of this whole process with the f-77 report out of the embassy. and we know that we took out almost 6,000, i guess it is, american citizens, but how many remain -- >> okay, do all of you agree that secretary of state blinken, when he made his analysis as to how many people would be here, would still be there. he talked about the 10 to 15,000 citizens left behind. and the -- and then they evacuated some 6,000. that would mean a minimum of 4,000 would be -- would still be there now. would anyone disagree with that? by your silence, i assume that you agree. >> i have no -- i don't -- i personally don't believe that there are 4,000 american citizens still left in afghanistan, but i cannot confirm or deny that, senator. >> so you think secretary of state was probably wrong in his analysis? thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. and just for the record, the chair and the vice chair/ranking member have each abided by the five-minute rule. so fair's their. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you, secretary austin, general milley, and general mckenzie for being here this morning. and secretary austin and general millie, thank you for your effort to put into some historical perspective what happened in afghanistan and for recognizing the incredible service and sacrifice of the troops who served there. general milley, in a hearing before the appropriations subcommittee on defense in june, i explicitly raised concerns about for plight of at-risk afghans due to our withdrawal. and i ask about the department's plans to evacuate them. now, you indicated today that you thought we might be facing the kind of desperate situation that we saw in kabul. but your response at that time was that, quote, lots of planning was ongoing and, this is, end quote, and the state department was leading efforts to pertaining to evacuating our afghan partners. and you explicitly told the committee that in your professional opinion, you did not see saigon 1975 in afghanistan. so, i'm just right to figure out why we missed or from a public perception, it appears that we did