0 there's no doubt in my mind that our efforts prevented an attack on the homeland from afghanistan, which was our core original mission. and everyone who has served in that war has been proud. your service mattered. beginning in 2011, we steadily drew down our troop numbers, consolidated and closed bases and retrograded equipment from afghanistan. at the peak in 2011, we had 97,000 u.s. troops alongside 41,000 nato troops in afghanistan. ten years later, when ambassador calisade signed the agreement on 29, february, 2020, the united states had 12,600 u.s. troops with 8,000 nato and 10,500 contractors. this has been a ten-year multi-administration drawdown. not a 19-month or 19-day ne-yo. under the doha agreement, the u.s. would begin to withdraw its forces, contingent upon the taliban meeting certain conditions, which would lead to a political agreement between the taliban and the government of afghanistan. there were seven conditions applicable to the taliban and eight conditions applicable to the united states. while the taliban did not attack u.s. forces, which was one of the conditions, it failed to fully honor any, any other condition under the doha agreement. and perhaps most importantly, for u.s. national security, the taliban has never renounced al qaeda or broke its affiliation with them. we, the united states, adhered to every condition. in the fall of 2020, my analysis was that an accelerated withdrawal, without meeting specific and necessary conditions, risks losing the substantial gains made in afghanistan, damaging u.s. worldwide credibility and could precipitate a general collapse of the ansf, and the afghan government, resulting in a complete taliban takeover or general civil war. that was a year ago. my assessment remained consistent throughout. based on my advice and the advice of the commanders, then secretary of defense esper submitted a memorandum on 9 november, recommending to maintain u.s. forces at a level between about 2,500 and 4,500 in afghanistan, until conditions were met for further reduction. two days later, on 11 november 2020, i received an unclassified, signed order directing the united states military to withdrawal all forces from afghanistan, no later than 15 january 2021. after further discussions regarding the risks associated with such a withdrawal, the order was rescinded. on 17 november, we received a new order, to reduce levels to 2,500, plus enabling forces, no later than 15 january. when president biden was inaugurated, there were approximately 3,500 u.s. troops, 5,400 nato troops, and 6300 contractors in afghanistan, with a specified task of train, advise, and assist, along with a small contingent of counterterrorism forces. the strategic situation at inauguration was stalemate. the biden administration through the national security council process conducted a rigorous interagency review of the situation in afghanistan in february, march, and april. during this process, the views of the joint chiefs of staff, all of us, the centcom commander, general mckenzie, the u.s. 4a commander, general miller, and myself, were all given serious consideration by the administration. we provided a broad range of options and our assessment of their potential outcomes. the cost/benefit, risk to force, and risk to mission were evaluated againstives of the united states. on 14 april, the president announced his decision and the u.s. military received a change of mission to retrograde all u.s. military forces, maintain a small contingency force of 6 to 700 to protect the embassy in kabul, until the department of state could coordinate contractor security support. and also to assist turkey to maintain the karzai international airport and transition the u.s. military to an over the horizon counterterrorism support and security force assistance. it is clear, it is obvious that the war in afghanistan did not end on the terms we wanted, with the taliban now in power in kabul. although the neo was unprecedented as the largest air evacuation in history, evacuating 124,000 people, it came at an incredible cost of 11 marines, one soldier, and a navy corpsman. those 13 gave their lives so a people they never met will have an opportunity to live in freedom. and we must remember that the taliban was and remains a terrorist organization and they still have not broken ties with al qaeda. i have no allusions as to who we are dealing with. it remains to see if the taliban can consolidate power or the country will further fracture into civil war. but we must continue to protect the united states of america and its people from terrorist attacks coming from afghanistan. a reconstituted al qaeda or isis with aspirations to attack the united states is a very real possibility. and those conditions to include activity in ungoverned spaces could present themselves in the next 12 to 36 months. that mission will be much harder now, but not impossible. and we will continue to protect the american people. strategic decisions have strategic consequences. over the course of four presidents, 12 secretaries of defense, 7 chairman, 10 centcom commanders, 20 commanders in afghanistan, hundreds of congressional delegation visits, and 20 years of congressional oversight, there are many lessons to be learned. two specific to the military that we immediate to take a look at and we will is we did mirror image the development of the afghan national army, and the second the rapid -- the unprecedented rapid collapse of the afghan military in only 11 days in august. however, one lesson must never be forgot. every soldier, airmen, and marine who served there in afghanistan for 27 years protected our country from attack by terrorists. and for that, they should be forever proud and we should be forever grateful. thank you, chairman. if i could, i know there are some issues in the media that are of deep concern to many members on the committee, and with your permission, i would like to address those for a minute or two. again, i've submitted a memoranda for the committee to look at. >> you may proceed. >> mr. chairman, i've served this nation for 42 years. i've spent years in combat and i've buried a lot of my troops who died while defending this country. my loyalty to this nation, its people, and the constitution hasn't changed and will never change as long as i have breath to give. my loyalty is absolute and i will not turn my back on the fallen. with respect to the chinese calls, i routinely communicated with my counterpart, general lee, with the knowledge and coordination of civilian oversight. i am specifically directed to communicate with the chinese with department of defense guidance and a policy dialogue system. these military-to-military communications at the highest level are critical to the security of the united states in order to deconflict military actions, manage crisis, and prevent war between great powers that are armed with the world's most deadly weapons. the calls on 30 october and 8 january were coordinated before and after with secretary esper and acting secretary miller's staffs and the interagency. the specific purpose of the october and january calls were to generate -- or were generated by concerning intelligence, which caused us to believe that the chinese were worried about an attack on them by the united states. i know -- i am certain that president trump did not intend to attack the chinese. and it is my directed responsibility and it was my directed responsibility by the secretary to convey that intent to the chinese. my task at that time was to de-escalate. my message again was consistent. stay calm, steady, and de-escalate. we are not going to attack you. at secretary of defense esper's direction, i made a call to general lee on 30 october. eight people sat in that call with me and i read out the call within 30 minutes of the call ending. on 31 december, the chinese requested another call with me. the deputy assistant secretary of defense for asia pacific policy helped coordinate my call, which was then scheduled for 8 january, and he made a preliminary call on 6 january. 11 people attended that call with me and readouts of this call were distributed through the interagency that same day. shortly after my call ended with general lee, i personally informed both secretary of state pompeo and white house chief of staff meadows about the call among other topics. soon after that, i attended a meeting with acting secretary miller, where i briefed him on the call. later that same day, on 8 january, speaker of the house pelosi called me to inquire about the president's ability to launch nuclear weapons. i sought to assure her that nuclear launch is governed by a very specific and deliberate process. she was concerned and made very -- made various personal references characterizing the president. i explained to her that the president is the sole nuclear launch authority and he doesn't launch them alone. and that i am not qualified to determine the mental health of the president of the united states. there are processes, protocols, and procedures in place and i repeatedly assured her that there is no chance of an illegal, unauthorized, or accidental launch. by presidential directive and secretary of defense directive, the chairman is part of the process to ensure the president is fully informed when determining the use of the world's deadliest weapons. by law, i am not in the chain of command and i know that. however, by presidential directive and dod instruction, i am in the chain of communication to fulfill my legal statutory role as the president's primary military adviser. after the speaker pelosi call, i convened a short meeting in my office, with key members of my staff, to refresh all of us on the procedures which we practice daily at the action officer level. additionally, i immediately informed acting secretary of defense miller of speaker pelosi's phone call. at no time, was i attempting to change or influence the process, usurp authority or insert myself in the chain of command. but i am expected, i am required to give me advice and ensure that the president is fully informed on military matters. i am submitting for the record a detailed and classified memoranda and i welcome a walk-through on every one of these events and would be happy to talk about the intelligence that drove these calls. i'm also happy to make available any email, phone logs, memoranda, witnesses or anything else you need to understand these events. my oath is to support the constitution of the united states of america, against all enemies, foreign and domestic. i and will never turn my back on that oath. i firmly believe the civilian control of the military is a bedrock principle essential to the health of this public and i'm committed to ensuring that the military stays clear of military politics. >> thank you, general. general mckenzie, i understand you do not have a statement. that correct? >> i'll waive my statement in order to get us back on schedule. >> thank you very much, general. secretary larson, the doha agreement represents direct negotiations with terrorists, and not just negotiations, but an agreement with them that excluted the afghan government and the allies that have been fighting with us now since 9/11. it set a fixed departure date with conditions has been indicated were not really fold consistently by the taliban. as you considered in april what to do, did the intelligence suggest to you that reneging on departure of the troops would lead to significant attacks against american and allied military forces? >> chairman, to my recollection, the intelligence was clear that if we did not leave in accordance with that agreement, the taliban would recommence attacks on our forces. >> and they would include whatever attacks they could to attack american forces? >> that's correct. >> so the choice in many respects were, were we going to incur additional casualties indefinitely in afghanistan. that's one way to look at it. is that fair? >> that's correct, chairman. you would have to take additional measures to be able to defend yourself. now, general milley, and general mckenzie, did the doha agreement affect the moral of the afghan forces? ie, was there a sense now that even though it was months away, that the united states was leaving since we had agreed to leave? >> i'll let frank talk the details, but my assessment is yes, senator, it did affect the moral of the afghan security forces. >> general mckenzie? >> it's my adjustment that the doha agreement did negatively affect the performance of the afghan forces, in particular by some of the actions that the government of afghanistan was required to undertake as part of that agreement. >> and one of the critical issues was the agreement to withdraw contractors, which are basically the engine that maintains the air force of afghanistan and many other logistical operations. and that was just as critical as the troop departure, i would assume? >> it was. we had plans in place to try to conduct those operations from over the horizon. they were not as effective as having contractors on the ground, on site with the aircraft. >> the momentum appeared to be shifting to the taliban. indications were their penetration or parts of the country in the northern sections, particularly which traditionally opposed the taliban, the northern alliance. and that started -- to be fair, that started long before doha. there are some commentators who have suggested that since 2014, the taliban have been surrounding provincial capitals, insinuating themselves into the politics of the local communities, striking bargains. is that your impression, too, general mckenzie? >> i think it is a good assessment, from 2014 on, the taliban did pursue that strategy, and they had some success. and the government of afghanistan also had success, holding on to centralized urban areas and population centers. but the taliban pursued a distinct strategy and had some success with it. >> now, general -- excuse me, secretary austin, you did provide your best military advice to the president regarding the situation in afghanistan, and as has been recounted several times, there were multiple meetings and he received advice from many different quarters. do you feel that you have the opportunity to make your advice very clear? >> i do, chairman. and as i've said before, i always keep my advice to the president confidential. but i am very much satisfied that we had a thorough policy review and i believe that all of the parties had an opportunity to provide input and that input was received. >> thank you very much. senator inhofe? >> thank you, mr. chairman. it was two weeks ago that we had a closed, classified hearing. we had general miller's recommendation at that time. let me, first of all, just mention that during their confirmation process, you committed -- and i'm speaking now to general mckenzie and general milley, to giving your honest and personal views to this committee, even if those views were different from those of the administration and i'm confident that you will be doing that. during this hearing that we had, we -- it was emphasized to us, from general miller, that we -- that he was recommending the 2,500 troops in afghanistan. now, we didn't receive the documentation from your offices. i say to the witnesses today, until, actually, 10:35 last night. so there really wasn't time to get into a lot of the details. but i would ask general mckenzie, did you agree to the recommendation that general miller had two weeks ago? >> senator, again, i won't share my personal recommendation with the president, but i will give you my honest opinion. and my honest opinion and view shaped my recommendation. i recommend that we maintain 2,500 troops in afghanistan. and i also recommended earlier in the fall of 2020, that we maintain 4,500 at that time. those were my personal views. i also have a view that the withdrawal of those forces would lead inevitably to the collapse of the afghan military forces, and eventually, the afghan government. >> i understand that. and general milley, i assume you agree with that in terms of the recommendation of 2,500? >> what i said in my opening statement and the memoranda that i wrote back in the fall of 2020 remained consistent, and i do agree with that. >> this committee is unsure as to whether or not general miller's recommendation ever got to the president. obviously, there were conversations with the president, but i would like to ask, even though general mckenzie, i think you've all made this statement, did you talk to the president about general miller's recommendation? >> sir, i was present when that discussion occurred. >> mm-hmm. >> and i'm confident that the president heard all of the recommendations and listened to them very thoughtfully. >> so one of the recommendations that was made by the three of you would be the recommendation that was originally made my general miller's two weeks ago. >> during the august 18th interview on abc, george stepnopoulos asked president biden whether u.s. troops would stay beyond august 31st if there were still americans to evacuate. president biden responded, and this is a quote, if there's american citizens left, we're going to stay to get them all out. this didn't happen. president biden's decision resulted in all of the troops leaving, but the american citizens are still trying to get out. how many american citizens is it your opinion are still there? just go down the line, each one of you. anyone? >> senator, i would defer to the state department for that assessment. that's a dynamic process. they've been contacting the civilians that are in afghanistan and again, i would defer to them for definitive numbers. >> go ahead. others? >> same, as the secretary just said. there were numbers at the beginning of this whole process with the f-77 report out of the embassy. and we know that we took out almost 6,000, i guess it is, american citizens, but how many remain -- >> okay, do all of you agree that secretary of state blinken, when he made his analysis as to how many people would be here, would still be there. he talked about the 10 to 15,000 citizens left behind. and the -- and then they evacuated some 6,000. that would mean a minimum of 4,000 would be -- would still be there now. would anyone disagree with that? by your silence, i assume that you agree. >> i have no -- i don't -- i personally don't believe that there are 4,000 american citizens still left in afghanistan, but i cannot confirm or deny that, senator. >> so you think secretary of state was probably wrong in his analysis? thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. and just for the record, the chair and the vice chair/ranking member have each abided by the five-minute rule. so fair's their. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you, secretary austin, general milley, and general mckenzie for being here this morning. and secretary austin and general millie, thank you for your effort to put into some historical perspective what happened in afghanistan and for recognizing the incredible service and sacrifice of the troops who served there. general milley, in a hearing before the appropriations subcommittee on defense in june, i explicitly raised concerns about for plight of at-risk afghans due to our withdrawal. and i ask about the department's plans to evacuate them. now, you indicated today that you thought we might be facing the kind of desperate situation that we saw in kabul. but your response at that time was that, quote, lots of planning was ongoing and, this is, end quote, and the state department was leading efforts to pertaining to evacuating our afghan partners. and you explicitly told the committee that in your professional opinion, you did not see saigon 1975 in afghanistan. so, i'm just right to figure out why we missed or from a public perception, it appears that we didn't anticipate the rapid fall of afghanistan and kabul and the rise of the taliban in the way we saw it play out on television. and what did we miss? >> i think, senator, we absolutely missed the rapid 11-day collapse of the afghan military, and the collapse of the government. i think there was a lot of intelligence that clearly indicated that after we withdrew, that it was a likely outcome of a collapse of the military and a collapse of the government most of those intelligence assessments indicated that that would occur late fall, perhaps early winter. kabul might hold until next spring. it depends on when the intel assessment was written. so after we leave, the assessments were pretty consistent that you would see a general collapse of the government and the military. while we were there, though, up through 31 august, i don't -- there's no intel assessment that says that the government is going to collapse and the military is going to collapse in 11 days, that i'm aware of. and i've read, i think, pretty much, all of them. so -- and even as late as the third of august and another one on the 8th of august, et cetera. they're still talking weeks, perhaps months, et cetera. general mckenzie can illuminate on his views on the same topic. he gave his assessments at the same time. and although general miller did in many, many assessments say rapid, fast, hard for collapse, he also centered into the october/november time frame as opposed to august. >> so how do we avoid that happening again? >> i think the key, senator, that we missed, frankly, we had some indicators, but we didn't have the full, wholesome assessment of leadership, morale, and will. there were some units and i don't want to say negative things about these guys. 60, 70,000 of the afghan service that were killed in action over the last 20 years. and many units did fight at the very end. but the vast majority put their weapons down and melted away in a very, very short period of time. i think that has to do with will, leadership, and i think we still need to try to figure out exactly why that was. and i have some suggestions, but i'm not settled on them yet. but we clearly missed that. i think one of the key factors we missed it for was, we pulled our advisers off three years ago. and when i pulled the advisers out of the units, you no longer can assess things like leadership and will. we can count all the planes, trucks, cars, automobiles, and everything else from space and all the other kind of intel assets. but you can't measure the human heart with a machine. you've got to be there. >> thank you. secretary austin, i'm about to run out of time, so you may want to respond to this on the next round, but one of the challenges with getting special immigrant visa applicants out of afghanistan has -- and this wasn't just a problem in the evacuate. this has been an historic problem that has gone over years, has been having the documents that show that they actually served with our military. and d.o.d. has been cited as the major problem in getting those documents. so, again, how do we make sure that doesn't happen again in some future conflict, where we need our partners on the ground to serve alongside of our military members? and i'm out of time. so, hopefully you will answer that, thank you. >> thank you very much, senator shaheen. senator wicker, please. >> chairman reid, before i ask my questions, i have an objection. we've been having hearings in a classified setting, on our first public hearing. but -- and i'm, senator kaine has had to step away, but in a previous hearing, he expressed frustration, in various hearings he had been to, and a frustration that i shared that when the state department is here. and we ask them a question, they say, well, you have to ask the defense department that. and now, today, again, defense department people are before us and a question was asked and the answer to senator inhofe, as well, you have to ask the state department that. senator kaine gently but fatherly sent a message to the administration at our last classified hearing that we need to cut that out. that members of the defense department need to be ready for the questions that we have asked and that we're going to ask. and so i object to the continuation of that in this hearing today. while i'm at it, i would also point out, general milley, i appreciate your statement and i've read it. and i understand what you're trying to say. but further than what you mentioned, the mention is that you told combatant commanders to report back to you. our clear understanding is that they are not in the chain of command -- you are not in their chain of command, that they report directly to the commander in chief through the secretary. so to the extent that you told them to report to you, that they were not in your chain of command. let me see if i get one question in here, having taken two minutes to mention a very important objection. general milley, in the fall of 2020, you said an accelerated withdrawal would risk substantial gains and damage u.s. credibility. i want to ask our witnesses about u.s. credibility. on july 8th, president biden said, the likelihood there's going to be taliban overrunning everything and owning the whole country is highly unlikely. we now know he was advised, actually, this might happen. turns out, it was completely untrue, that state on july 8th. later in july, the president united states, president biden says, i trust the capacity of the afghan military, better trained, better equipped, and more competent in terms of conducting the war. president biden was wrong on that. we told our interpreters, our drivers, our friends, the people who had had our backs during this entire period of time that we would not abandon them. and that's exactly what we did. and in an interview that's already been referred to on network news, president biden says, and i quote, if there's american citizens left, we're going to stay and get them all out. two days later, the president of the united states unequivocally said, any american that wants to come on, we'll get you home. we're going to stay and get them out. the president of the united states, our commander in chief, did exactly the opposite. now, i think you were right, general milley, when you advised that our credibility would be damaged. our credibility has been gravely damaged, as it not, general milley? >> i think that our credibility, with allies and partners around the world, and with adversaries, is being intensely reviewed by them to see which way this is going to go. and i think the damage is one word that could be used, yes. >> yes. and secretary austin, no question that this sends a disastrous message to china and russia. what message does it send to our nato allies and our other allies around the world about not only our credibility, but our national resolve? >> thanks, senator. what the world witnessed is the united states military evacuating 124,000 people out of a contested environment, in 17 days. >> well, you testified that that was a great accomplishment. our withdrawal and our evacuation. what about our credibility? >> as i engage my counterparts, i think our credibility remains solid. clearly senator, there will be people who question things going forward, but i would say that we -- you know, the united states military is one that -- and the united states of america, people place great trust and confidence in. and relationships with things that we have to work on continuously. and we understand that and we'll continue to do that. >> thank you, senator. senator gillibrand, please? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'm also very grateful to our service members who committed so much over the last 20 years. and i do want to thank president biden for taking the tough, yet necessary step to stop and end an endless war, something that many of us have pushed for over the last decade. there's obviously, still a lot to do, both overseas and here at home, such as ensuring that afghan refugees are treated respectfully and responsibly, both on the dod basis, such as ensuring that they can be transitioned into their new lives in the united states. we also have the responsibility to our troops and to all americans to make sure that we have a complete picture of what we did, accomplished, and happened over the last 20 years, across all the administrations. we have to look back so we can do better when we look forward. one way to look better is to make sure that congress maintains and fulfills its constitutional responsibility. we have to put back into the hands of congress the right and responsibility to declare war. what started as a mission to defeat al qaeda in afghanistan and the perceived threat in iraq expanded to 20 years of war in multiple countries with hundreds of thousands of lives lost and trillions of dollars spent. this is why i introduced the war powers reform resolution, so that congress can take back this responsibility for the benefit of our service members. congress must set clear and defined goals for the use of military force abroad and place a limit to how long, where, and against whom we can continue military action without a new authorization in order to finally put a stop to endless wars and prevent them in the future. second, there should be a comprehensive, rigorous, and objective audit on the war in its entirety. over the last 20 years, the united states spent more than $2 trillion on the war in afghanistan, and we lost thousands of american lives and tens of thousands of afghan civilians. i commend the special inspector general for afghan reconstruction for its independent and objective oversight of the afghanistan reconstruction. but i do have questions beyond that. first, general milley, in your testimony, you said -- you mentioned that there are many lessons to be learned. what did you mean by that statement? >> i think -- senator, thank you. i think there's a series of strategic lessons to be learned. and i would echo some of the ones that senator reid mentioned early on. specific military lessons, we have to take a hard look at. the united states military was tasked under the 2002 bon agreement to train, man, and equip the afghan army. the germans were required to train, man, and equip the afghan police. as we built that army and all of its components, i think that one error we may have made over time is we made them too dependent on technology, too dependent on our capabilities. we didn't take in the cultural aspects perhaps as much as we should have and mirror imagined, to put it simply. i think that's a big lesson, we'll have to take a big look at it. and when you pull contractors, you pull troops, which is one of many contributing factors to the rapid collapse. that is a big lesson. i think one is in the military realm, as well as the intelligence community rem. there's a lot of other lessons, legitimacy of the government, corruption of the government, those sorts of things are all out there as to why that government collapsed as rapidly as it could. but there's a specific set of military lessons we need to pull out within the military. >> i've also read -- i've read various opinion pieces. i know everyone here is deeply disturbed that the trained afghan military did not perform as expected. i would like your thoughts on if they had performed as expected, would we have seen a prolonged civil war. what is your estimate of what the impact of them actually fighting would have been? my estimate is, if they had, you know, performed as we expected them to perform, that the government would still be there, they would have probably lost significant chunks of territory, but kabul would be there and some of the major provincial capitals. but i would defer that, you would probably get a more granular view of that from general mckenzie. >> general mckenzie? >> had the afghan military fought, we would have seen the approaches to kabul get into the winter still under the control of the government of afghanistan. a lot of the outlying provinces would not have been. but i would just note that it wasn't so much the collapse of the afghan military as the collapse of the afghan government writ large. those two things happened together. and they were completely linked together. so when you consider one, i think you have to think about the other. >> additionally in retrospect, one of the areas of debate has been whether we should have started our evacuation earlier. and i recognize that the kabul government asked us not to start our evacuation early. can you speak to what you now know and whether it would have been smarter or more effective if we had started evacuating personnel a year in advance or six months in advance or any time in advance. >> can i ask the senator -- i apologize. i didn't realize my time was expired. i'll submit that for the record. >> thank you so much, senator gillibrand. senator fisher, please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i too would like to thank our military men and women for their dedication to this country, for the sacrifices that they and their families make in any theater of war and make every day for us. but our exit from afghanistan was a disaster and the missteps that are there are outlined had consequences that struck close to hope. as a nebraskan, corporal dagan paige was one of the 13 service members killed in action. and we should not forget, we have the policy discussions here today that let us remember the human sacrifice. we also left american citizens behind. general milley, in your written testimony, you stated withdrawal would increase risks of regional instability, the security of pakistan and its nuclear arsenals, a global rise in violent extremist organizations, our global credibility with allies and partners would suffer, and a narrative of abandoning the afghans would become widespread. would you agree that all of these things have happened over the last eight weeks or are currently happening? >> i think in the main, yes, senator. most of those are probably happening right now. >> and i hope that we see in the future military advice having more consideration by the administration on what will happen from what you and general mckenzie have said today. >> if i may, senator, i can tell you with 100% certainty that the military voice was heard and it was considered. >> it was considered, but not followed, correct? >> presidents are elected for reasons. they make strategic decisions. >> i would say this committee has always stressed that commanders on the ground should be listened to. would you agree with that? >> i would and i would tell you that they were listened to. i think there's a difference between us having an opportunity to have a voice and i think it's very important that the military has a voice, but i firmly believe in the military and i am required and the military commanders are required to give our best military advice. but the decision makers are not required in any manner, shape, or form to follow that advice. >> no, they are not, and i agree with you about civilian control of this country. but i think it's important to realize when we continue to see missteps by an administration that's costing lives. secretary austin, it's been reported right now that the biden administration reached out to russia about using russian bases in the central asian bases bordering afghanistan to the north for our strike assets to fly out of for the over the horizon counterterrorism mission s. is that true? >> senator, this is a mission that i believe came up during a conversation that the president had with president putin, where president putin offered to offer to provide assistance. >> but have you reached out to the russians asking specifically to use bases? general milley just recently had a conversation with his russian counterpart. >> so the reports are true that have been coming out today? >> i can assure you that we are not seeking russia's permission to do anything. but i believe and general milley can speak for himself, but i believe he asked for clarification on what that author was. >> i have a number of questions about over the horizon and the capabilities as we look to the future and what's available there. but i think it's what we're seeing in the reports today about asking to use russian bases, that's just another example of the biden administration that have left us in taeshl position that we have to ask them to keep us safe from terrorists and ask them to use their installations. >> and we're not asking the russians for anything. >> but you're negotiating to trying to get these bases to be able to use their speculations, because afghanistan is a land-locked country. and when we have explanations from the military and they give examples for over the horizon and use countries like libya and yemen and somalia, that does not put into consideration that afghanistan is landlocked. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to express my hope that this hearing is just the beginning, a first step in an in-depth analysis going not just to the last ten weeks, but ten weeks and longer back, so we can match the courage of the men and women of america, all of them and all of their families, not just in afghanistan, but around the world. and we owe them, veterans of america, much more than we're giving them right now, because they have earned it. that in-depth analysis, looking backward, is essential, but i want to look forward right now with what is happening with respect to america and our afghan allies. it was left to an unofficial network or coalition of veterans, ngos, some government officials. i was involved in an effort through chartered planes and airports outside of kabul to try to airlift on a makeshift ad hoc basis americans and afghan allies still there. they have targets on their back. their situation is increasingly urgent. and desperate. and i have been frustrated by the lack of someone in charge and lines of authority. a point person. we need an evacuation czar. somebody who will provide a plan and supervisors action so we can get out of afghanistan. and we don't have an estimate on the number, because nobody is in charge right now. so let me ask you, secretary austin, who at the department of defense has overall responsibility with overseeing the effort to evacuate? >> first of all, senator, thank you to you and your colleagues for all you've done to try to help get american citizens out of afghanistan. the state department, following the departure of the military, the state department remained engaged and continued to work to get american citizens out. and as we've seen some 85 american citizens and 79 legal permanent residents have departed villa the kabul airport. and so that work continues on. the state department set up a cell to continue the work and that is headed up by ambassador bass. as you may recall, ambassador bass was one of the senior counselors on the ground as we were conducting the investigation. i have a general officer that is a part of that cell, and we have reached out to -- or ambassador bass has reached out to veterans groups and others who mauf information that can help us continue to contact and eventually evacuate american citizens and lprs. so this work continues, and we remain committed to continuing that work until we get out as many american citizens that are willing to come out. >> well, there was a point, and you can call it the eye of the storm, when the taliban had taken over the country, but really wasn't in charge when we could have evacuated a great many more americans and our afghan allies. the translators, guards, security officers and i feel that the administration was on notice. in fact, a group of us went to the white house in the spring and urged that there be a plan for evacuation. and unfortunately, the withdrawal discredited there from being anybody on the ground. and in the wake of that withdrawal, there was a vacuum of leadership, and i would hope that there would be more effective action now to put somebody in charge and develop a plan, because we know that there are many americans, whether it's green card holders or citizens or others still there in connecticut, we have a resettlement organization called iris, has told us individuals who are still there, more than 40 in kabul. i'm sure organization, who have told us of individuals that are there, more than 40 in kabul. >> thank you. senator cotton, please. >> thank you. general milley, it's your testimony that you recommended 2500 troops approximately stay in afghanistan? >> as i've said many times before this committee or other committees, i don't share my personal recommendations with the president, but i can tell you my personal opinion if you want. >> yes, please. >> yes. my assessment was back in the fall and it remained consistent throughout that we should keep a steady 2500 in order to move toward a negotiated solution. >> did you ever present that assessment personally to president biden? >> i don't discuss what my conversations are with the personal opinions are with the president. >> okay. do you share that assessment? >> i do share that assessment. >> did you ever share that with president biden? >> i'm not going to comment on my personal discussions. >> did general milley? >> ask him. >> president biden last month in an interview said that no military leader advised him to leave a small troop presence in afghanistan. is that true? >> senator cotton, i believe -- first of all, i know the president to be an honest and forthright man. >> it's a simple question, secretary austin. he said no senior military leader advised him to leave a small troop presence behind. is that true or not? did the recommendations get to the president personally? >> their input was received by the president and considered by the president for sure. in terms of what they specifically recommended, senator, as they just said, they're not going to provide what they recommended in confidence. >> it's shocking to me. it sounds to me like maybe their best military advice was never presented personally to the president of the united states about such a highly consequential matter. let me move onto another recommendation they're reported to have made. it was the unanimous recommendation of the joint chiefs that we not maintain a military presence beyond august 31st. when was that unanimous recommendation sought and presented to the president? >> are you talking about the 31 august? >> yes. >> on 25 august i was asked to make an assessment and provide best military advice. >> august 25th. >> correct. >> kabul fell on august 15th. >> that is correct. >> you were not asked before august 25th? >> on august 25th i was asked to provide an assessment on whether we should keep troops beyond august 31st. >> the president asked us to provide an assessment on whether or not we should extend our preference beyond august 31st. as general milley just said, that assessment was made. we tasked them to make that assessment on the 25th and he came back and provided his best military advice. >> kabul fell on august 15th. it was clear we had thousands of americans in afghanistan behind taliban lines on august 15th. it took ten days to ask these general officers if we should extend our presence? i suspect the answer may be a little. different if you asked them 16 days out, not five days out. president biden's evacuation screwed things upcoming and come as it relates to afghan evacuees. we left behind thousands of afghans who were vetted and approved to come here. you now have female troops who have been assaulted. you have afghan evacuees committing sex crimes at fort mccoy. what are we to make of this? what steps are we taking to ensure that thousands of afghans about who we know nothing are not going to be a menace to our troops at military bases and the communities? >> i'm aware of the allegations and i take the allegations very seriously. i can assure you that our commanders at our bases have what they need to be able to protect our troops and our families that work and live at those bases. i'm in contact with general van hurd the north come commander who has overall responsibility for the operation on a routine base. >> i have one final question. general milley, i can only conclude that your advice about staying in afghanistan was rejected. i'm shocked to learn that your advice wasn't sought until august 25th. i understand that you're the principal military advisor. if all this is true, why haven't you resigned? >> senator, as a senior military officer, resigning is a really serious thing. it's a political act if i'm resigning in protest. my job is to provide legal advice or best military advice to the president. that's my legal requirement. that's what the law is. the president doesn't have to agree with that advice. he doesn't have to make those decisions just because we're generals. it would be an incredible act of political defiance for a commissioned officer to just resign because my advice isn't taken. this country doesn't want generals figuring out what orders we're going to accept and do or not. that's not our job. it's critical. my dad didn't get a choice to resign at iwo jima. they can't resign, so i'm not going to resign. there's no way. if the orders are legal, we're in a different place. if the orders are legal from civilian authority, i intend to carry them out. >> senator hirono, please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. do i understand you correctly that your personal recommendation was that the troops remain in afghanistan, a certain number of them beyond the august 31st deadline? >> no, senator. this is the joint chiefs of staff. this is myself included, general mckenzie, major general donahue, the ground tactical commander of the 82nd airborne division. there's no political pressure. there's no expectation of consensus. every one of us evaluated the military conditions at the time and we made unanimous recommendation that we end the military mission and transition to a diplomatic mission. >> while you testified that you may have had the personal recommendation i think in your case general mckenzie in the fall of 2020, that by the time we're evacuating everyone, that was not a recommendation that you personally held? >> no. on the 25th of august we recommended that the mission end on the 31st. >> thank you for that clarification. >> thank you. >> so the evacuation was chaotic, yes. we are really grateful that our military performed magnificently in evacuating over 120,000 people. secretary austin, secretary blinken acknowledged to my colleagues on the senator foreign relations committee that no one believed the afghan military and government could collapse as early as it did. however, u.s. forces conducted at least a couple of air strikes in the middle of july aimed at blunting the taliban's rapid advance. secretary austin, the d.o.d. was aware that the situation was deteriorating rapidly by july.
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